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Executive Summary 
 
The increasing human influence on ecosystems and the ensuing unsustainable exploitation and 
degradation has led in many places to depletion and loss of function of these ecosystems. These 
problems cannot be solved by (innovative) financing mechanisms, as the causes do not lie in a 
lack of financing mechanisms. Although decifit in funding in general is an important issueCCCthe 
amount of finance available for ecosystems and biodiversity falls short of the funding needed. But 
the lack of funding can probably also not be solved by the implementation of innovative financing 
mechanisms. The amount of finance available for ecosystems reflects the willingness of people or 
their governments to make available funds for ecosystem management. This willingness in turn, is 
influenced by various factors, amongst others: 
1. Recognition or awareness of the value of ecosystems other than the production functions 
that ecosystems and biodiversity fulfil. Although these functions and their potential value 
have been described by a variety of valuation methods, political recognition to include 
these values adequately in decisionCmaking is still incipient.  
2. Confidence in effectiveness of funding as a solution to ecosystem management (i.e. will 
more funding lead to better management). This is linked to the institutional environment in 
a country (how well does the legal system work; is there corruption; etc) and the 
governance regime of an ecosystem (how effective is the ecosystem management; is the 
management equitable etc.). 
 
Thus, only when such conditions are fulfilled and there is a willingness to finance ecosystems, it is 
useful to discuss the question of how to financeCCCi.e. by which mechanism. Of course the financing 
mechanism itself may influence the willingness to make available funding for ecosystem 
managementCCCthere should be confidence in the effectivness of the financing mechanism too. 
 
The study has aimed to highlight a few innovations in financing mechanisms for ecosystem 
management. By no means it has tried to be complete or has meant to convey the message that 
‘old’ financing mechanisms are no longer relevant. The innovative financing mechanisms seem to 
arise out of two innovations. First a revision in legislation such as in the case of agriCenvironmental 
schemes or new provisions under the Kyoto Protocol (or the Bali agreement). Second, the 
involvement of the private sector which is often linked to also financial innovations, such as the 
venture capital example. 
 
New or adapted legislation is often crucial for the emergence of innovative financing mechanisms 
because it creates the conditions for these to emerge, creates a level playing field or enables the 
trading of ecosystem services so that a monetary value can be attached to them. But legislation 
alone is not enough – a well functioning institutional environment is necessary to implement and 
enforce this. 
 
The involvement of the private sector seems to feasible only in case there are financial returns to 
the ecosystem managementCCCsuch as ecotourism, selling of goods (animals, timber, or other 
products). For ecosystem functions with a public goods nature where such financial returns are 
not possible, financial innovations linked to the private sector seem improbable. 
 
Whether innovative financial mechanisms contribute to poverty alleviation depends on the goal of 
the financial mechanisms and at whom they are targeted. But an important factor influencing the 
outcome of financial mechanisms lies in the governance regimes of ecosystems: how rights and 
responsibilities over the use and management of ecosystems are distributed. Often, local poor 
stakeholders do not have rights or their rights are ignored or overruled.  
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In practice, very different financial mechanisms, transferring funds from different funding sources 
are combined and bundled. There is no one successful approach (one size fits all approach) and 
each ecosystem management project has its own unique combination. There are many reports, 
reviews and practical guides on (innovative) mechanisms. But it must be stressed that the 
following conditions must be in place: 
• The existence of an institutional environment that: 
o Enforces rights of stakeholders in ecosystems and protects these from powerful 
interests groups 
o Provides safe financial institutions that are able deal with substantial financial flows 
• The existence of a governance regime that ensures the sustainable management of 
ecosystems and in which roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders are defined 
and implemented 
• The effectiveness of the financing mechanisms must be communicated, which means that 
it must be clear how funding has been used, and how this has led to improved ecosystem 
functions. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This study was commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) 
with the purpose to: 
1. identify the available key actors and mechanisms for financing of functions of ecosystems 
(consumers, distribution mechanisms, producers, levels –local, national, global), 
2. identify the factors that determine the acceptability and applicability (e.g. obstacles and 
conditions for implementation and institutionalisation in policy processes), the enabling 
environment (legislation regulation etc., willingness to pay) 
The overarching goal for the Ministry for this project is to strengthen the acceptability and 
applicability of financial mechanisms to sustain functions of ecosystems and biodiversity. 
 
Innovative financing mechanisms is a broad topic, constituting a myriad of different instruments 
and procedures that are being implemented for different goals. It is therefore not easy to combine 
being very specific on the one hand and discussing all (innovative) financing mechanisms that exist 
for all ecosystems. We have therefore opted for a more general approach, outlining general 
issues that are of importance in any innovative financing mechanisms. We have tried to add some 
specificity by presenting a few examples of innovative financing mechanisms as illustrations. 
 
After the introduction, which specifies the problem statement and knowledge questions that will be 
addressed, the study addresses in chapter 2 the context of financing mechanisms that 
determines the factors that determine the acceptability and applicablity of financing mechanisms 
as well as its enabling environment. Chapter 3 then gives an overview of existing financing 
mechanisms and some examples of innovative financing mechanisms that have been developed 
and implemented recently. In chapter 4 we conclude with some guidance on do’s and don’ts. 
These consists of suggestions to policy makers who would like to facilitate the implementation of 
(innovative) financing mechanisms, as well as some pointers to those who would like to put into 
practice innovative financing mechanisms.  
 
In this report we will not discuss how financing mechanisms and the funds they raise are 
implemented to manage ecosystems in an effective and sustainable manner. For this we refer to 
other studies such as Emerton et al. (2006). This paper builds on a previous reports that have 
been commissioned by LNV on innovative financing mechanisms for forests (see Lette and 
Rozemijer, 2005), the knowledge scan that was prepared in 2006 (Verschuuren et al., 2007) and 
a meeting organised by LNV on knowledge questions (LNV, 2007). 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
 
The increasing human influence on ecosystems and the ensuing unsustainable exploitation and 
degradation has led in many places to depletion and loss of function of these ecosystems. In the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005), the type, extent, causes and results have been 
described and it has been recognized that in many locations the situation is severe to such an 
extent that further degradation may lead to abrupt and irreversible damage, and that measures to 
reverse this development are urgent. The Assessment found that approximately 60% (15 out of 
24) of the ecosystem functions it examined are being degraded or used unsustainably, including 
fresh water, capture fisheries, air and water purification, and the regulation of regional and local 
climate, natural hazards, and pests.  
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These problems cannot be solved by (innovative) financing mechanisms, as the causes do not lie 
in a lack of financing mechanisms. Although decifit in funding in general is an important issueCCCthe 
amount of finance available for ecosystems and biodiversity falls short of the funding needed (see 
Figure 1 for the deficit for protected areas). In general, the funds invested in biodiversity in the 
world are not well known (Mulder et al. in prep.) but available estimates suggest a total global 
annual expenditure of 6.5 billion US$ (see e.g. James et al., 2001) and a shortfall of 2.3 billion 
US$. The shortfall is highest in developing countries (see Figure 1).  
 
But the lack of funding can probably also not be solved by the implementation of innovative 
financing mechanisms. The amount of finance available for ecosystems reflects the willingness of 
people or their governments to make available funds for ecosystem management. This willingness 
in turn, is influenced by various factors, amongst others: 
1. Recognition or awareness of the value of ecosystems other than the production functions 
that ecosystems and biodiversity fulfil. Although these functions and their potential value 
have been described by a variety of valuation methods, political recognition to include 
these values adequately in decisionCmaking is still incipient.  
2. Confidence in effectiveness of funding as a solution to ecosystem management (i.e. will 
more funding lead to better management). This is linked to the institutional environment in 
a country (how well does the legal system work; is there corruption; etc) and the 
governance regime of an ecosystem (how effective is the ecosystem management; is the 
management equitable etc.). 
 
Thus, only when such conditions are fulfilled and there is a willingness to finance ecosystems, it is 
useful to discuss the question of how to financeCCCi.e. by which mechanism. Of course the financing 
mechanism itself may influence the willingness to make available funding for ecosystem 
managementCCCthere should be confidence in the effectivness of the financing mechanism too. 
 
 
Figure 1: Annual costs of managing existing protected areas in developing countries, 
current spending, and funding deficit 
 
 
(Source: Bruner et al., 2004)  
 
Whatever the precise figures, it is clear that from a broader perspective i.e. sustainable use of 
land resources, funding for ecosystem functions in future will need to become much higher. An 
important issue is that (additional) funding will be effective in achieving sustainable ecosystem 
management.  
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Worldwide many initiatives have been started in the area of policy development and 
implementation that aim to broaden or diversify the financial basis of ecosystem management (eg. 
KatoombaCgroup, RUPES). These initiatives give increasing attention to the generation of 
additional cashflows for ecosystem functions. Often these initiatives are in the pilot phase and 
much still has to be learned and developed to scaleCup and institutionalize these initiatives (e.g. in 
terms of governance, distribution of cost, benefits and responsibilities and creating a suitable 
enabling environment).  
 
The Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Protected Areas (UNEP, 2003) observes that inadequate 
funding per se is not the only financing problem that ecosystems such as protected areas face. 
Worldwide, the bulk of funding for conservation comes from shortCterm development assistance 
projects (3C5 years) and erratic annual government allocations. This is why they call for 
sustainable, secure, longCterm financing mechanisms, which are presently the exception to the 
rule. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
The following general knowledge questions were formulated at the beginning of the project: 
1) On the basis of the stock taking study (Verschuuren et al., 2007) which outlined which 
financing mechanisms are available/possible and which ones are currently used, an analysis 
of these instruments will be carried out. The following distinction in different financing 
mechanisms can be used1:  
a) Self organized private market arrangements (e.g, certification mechanisms, and 
private contracts); 
b) Voluntary private, nonCmarket funding mechanisms (e.g. donations and lotteries); 
c) Government supported market creation (e.g. offCset and trading schemes/tradable 
permits to limit access, ecoClabelling); 
d) Government run financing mechanisms but also the creation of an enabling 
environment). (e.g. user fees, public funding, taxes and tax incentives, green venture 
capital funds, liability and compensation schemes, biodiversity offsets,  
2) Which aboveCmentioned financing mechanisms are appropriate for which functions and on 
what level (local, regional, national and global)? 
3) What are the strong and weak points of each mechanism? 
4) What are the main obstacles and conditions for successful implementation to ecosystem 
management? (incl. institutional, technical, institutional economics (transaction costs), 
financial, social, psychological, political etc) 
5) Based on 2, 3, and 4 what mechanisms have the best perspective to be introduced and under 
which conditions. 
6) How can Financing mechanisms for Ecosystem functions contribute to poverty alleviation? 
How is the construction of the financial distribution mechanism arranged? How can the 
producers of the service be involved? What is being paid for and what monitoring is necessary 
to verify that the service is being rendered? 
 
A stakeholder workshop was organised on 12 December 2007 to discuss the report as well as 
some practical do’s and don’ts for both practitioners and policy makers. The results of this have 
been added to the appendix. It was decided not to discuss these in the report as much 
information is already available and it would not have been possible to be exhaustive in this report. 
References to practical guides is given in appendix 4. The focus in this report is therefore on the 
context and prerequisites for the implementation of innovative financial mechanisms. 
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1.3 Definitions 
 
1.3.1 Ecosystem functions 
Ecosystem functions are the goods and services an ecosystem delivers2. There is a range of 
ecosystem functions, which can be categorized as: 
• Biodiversity 
• CarbonCsequestration 
• Watershed protection 
• Preserving landscape beauty 
 
Ecosystem functions can be characterized by two qualities: (i) rivalry (sometimes also called 
subtractability) and (ii) excludability. Rivalry can be illustrated by timber production: timber can 
only be cut down and used once. Using the function makes it more scarce. The expression “you 
can’t have your cake and eat it” illustrates rivalry. Different functions may also be rival – timber 
production is for instance rival with watershed protection (if you cut down the forest you can no 
longer maintain the watershed protection function). But in other cases functions are not rival – for 
instance, a forest can provide watershed functions and recreation functions at the same time. 
Excludability can be illustrated by the fact that it is difficult to exclude parties downstream from 
enjoying the benefits attached to watershed protection, especially when these are many. 
Recreation is easier to regulate – for instance by setting up gates at the entrance. 
 
The extent of rivalry and excludability will determine the degree of market failure (LandellCMills and 
Porras, 2002). Ecosystem functions that are excludable and nonCrival are described as club or toll 
goods since markets can be set up in the form of tolls or clubs. An example of a toll good is that 
of roads in national parks where entry is controlled. Where goods are both excludable and rival 
they are described as private. These may be easily supplied by the private sector based on 
market transactions but not necessarily (see below). Finding financing mechanisms for public and 
commonCpool functions is the most difficult. This is because the high costs of exclusion (termed 
demarcation by Vatn et al., 2002) so that it is only accessible to those who pay specifically for it. 
 
Table 1: Public and private environmental functions: excludability and rivalry 
Rivalry 
Excludability 
Low High 
Low 
Type: Public goods, e.g. most 
ecosystem functions 
Type: Common pool resources, e.g. 
community woodland, meadow or 
water resources 
 
High 
Type: Toll/club goods e.g. forest 
park roads for recreation 
 
 
Type: Private functions, e.g. timber 
and NTFPs 
 
 
NB The shade of grey displays the degree to which it is a private good 
(Based on: LandellCMills and Porras, 2002; Ostrom et al., 1994) 
 
Ecosystem functions are also often described as a positive externality. In much of the literature it 
is taken for given what is a gain and what is a cost, what is a positive or negative externality, what 
is a harm or a sacrifice (see also Vatn et al., 2002). But it is in fact difficult to define what 
constitutes an ecosystem function. This can be explained better when we define externalities (and 
ecosystem functions) as interdependencies3. Interdependencies exist when an action of one agent 
influences those of another. It creates conflicts when interdependent actors cannot realize their 
interests simultaneously. Conflicts have to be resolved in the sense of defining whose interests 
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are to prevail and to what degree. These interests are often translated into rights: e.g. does 
someone have the right to pollute or does the person who suffers from pollution have the right to 
clean water? Does a farmer who pollutes groundwater through the use of fertilizers deliver an 
ecosystem function when he reduces the level of fertilizers and be compensated for the costs he 
has made? Or should he not be allowed to pollute groundwater in the first place and should he be 
fined when he does4? Or in the case of forests, the question is whether someone has the right to 
cut the forest for timber or whether others have the right to enjoy the forest for recreation, or its 
watershed functions. 
 
The issue of rights can be usually solved when externalities/interdependencies or ecosystem 
functions arise on a local level and the parties can come to an agreement. However, on a global 
level (e.g. with greenhouse gases and global warming) coming to an agreement is much more 
difficult. Who has the right to emit carbon dioxide, and who has the right to expect others to lower 
their emissions are the difficult topics of agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
 
1.3.2 Financing mechanism 
For this study, we adopt the definition of Verweij (2002:3) who defines innovative financing 
mechanisms (financing mechanism ) as “an institutional arrangement that results in the transfer of 
new or increased financial resources from those willing to pay for sustainably produced goods 
and/or forest ecological services, to those willing to provide these functions in turn”5. 
 
Financing mechanisms can be directed at paying for outputs (environmental goods ans services) 
or for inputs (investment costs). We make no distinction between these two in this report. 
According to Powell & White (2001) financing mechanisms can be characterised by the degree of 
government intervention in the administration of the mechanism including selfCorganised private 
deals, trading schemes, and public funding schemes. Emerton et al. (2006) have categorised the 
set of financing mechanisms according to two dimensions – the source of funding (private versus 
public) and the mechanism (market based versus nonCmarket based), see Figure 2. The financing 
mechanisms shown in the picture are not exhaustive but serve as an illustration. Appendix 6.2 
gives a more definitive overview of possible financing mechanisms. 
 
The set of four main categories of financing mechanisms that we will use throughout the report 
easily fit into this typology: 
 Self organized private market arrangements (left hand upper corner); 
 Voluntary private, nonCmarket funding mechanisms (right hand upper corner); 
 Government supported market creation (left hand bottom corner); 
 Government run financing mechanisms but also the creation of an enabling environment (right 
hand bottom corner). 
We have to note (in accordance with de Groot et al., Forthcoming) that people not only donate 
their money, but also their time (Holl and Howarth, 2000).  
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Figure 2: A typology of financing mechanisms 
 
(Source: Emerton et al., 2006) 
 
Financing mechanisms also entails the rules, regulations etc in place that specify the agreements 
between the supplier of ES and beneficiaries, administer the contribution, and deal with default or 
other conflicts. These rules and regulations can be formal (e.g. binding legal contract, or 
membership of an organization) or informal (oneCoff donations to a fund) or in between (buying a 
ticket to a national park).  
 
Any setCup for implementing financing mechanisms must also be able to mobilize support for the 
protection of the ecosystem functions (see Ruhweza and Masiga, 2007 for Uganda). To do so, it 
must be able to locate the beneficiaries (or their delegates), encourage them to provide support. 
Scope, number of beneficiaries, whether beneficiaries have delegated decisionCmaking to 
representatives, etc, influence the setCup of the financing mechanism. 
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2 The context and preconditions of innovative financing 
mechanisms  
 
 
 
 
2.1 Valuation of ecosystem functions 
 
For ecosystem functions that have a private goods nature and are traded through market 
mechanisms, valuation and financing (payment) coincide. For ecosystem functions that have a 
public goods this does not always apply. This is why much effort has been put into valuation 
(methodologies). What is measured are preferences of people and their willingness to pay, a 
concept that is key in valuation studies. Many valuation studies assume that people have a set of 
stable and measurable preferences and are therefore able to value each ecosystem function. But 
these assumptions may not be correct for two reasons. First, people may be unable to value in a 
common currency (e.g. in monetary values) their individual benefit for each possible ecosystem 
function6. Even if they would be able to rank their preferences, which assumes that they know the 
complete list of potential ecosystem functions, it would be impossible to aggregate their 
preferences7. Second, it is safe to assume that people in fact do not know the complete list of 
potential ecosystem functions. People in general or decisionCmakers specifically (e.g. government) 
therefore cannot decide which project to realize – i.e. whether to manage and sustainable use 
ecosystem functions or which one, if means are limited8.  
 
 
With the risk of generalization, two directions can be discerned in the valuation debate. One 
direction, consisting of ‘proCvaluation’ economists, continues to put effort into refining 
methodologies and tries to increase accuracy. The other direction is more difficult to put under 
one heading, but consists of economists who question the premises of valuation (i.e. that 
 
Main points of this chapter 
• Innovative financing mechanisms (financing mechanism s) cannot be viewed in 
isolation of their institutional environment in which they are embedded 
• The institutional environment affects whether property rights, laws on ecosystem 
protection etc. are upheld and to what extent powerful interests prevail over those of 
more vulnerable and poor resource managers. 
• financing mechanisms are also linked to the governance regime that manages the 
ecosystem, whether it is state, community or privately owned and managed. The 
governance regime of an ecosystem also determines how rights and responsibilities 
are shared. 
• Ecosystem functions that constitute public goods are the most difficult to link to 
financing mechanisms. 
• Beneficiaries’ willingness to pay for ecosystem functions is influenced by the 
information they receive on the importance of the ecosystem function, the 
effectiveness of the governance regime managing the ecosystem functions, as well 
as their knowledge on who receives funds. 
• The scope on which ecosystem functions manifest (from local to global) has an 
impact on the type of financing mechanism that can be used. 
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preferences can be measured) and therefore think that further refinement of valuation 
methodologies is not useful. They differ in terms of what they suggest as alternatives to valuation. 
One group has been focusing on the fact that preferences are not exogenous (i.e. fixed and given) 
but endogenous and shaped by institutions (in terms of rules, laws, norms etc). Thus instead of 
focusing on measuring preferences and then basing decisions on these, one must focus on the 
institutions themselves and how they shape and express preferences. The ‘proCvaluation’ line of 
thinking seems to assume a central planner (e.g. government) who takes decisions on the basis of 
valuation studiesCCCit weights different options in for instance a costCbenefit analysis. But often 
decisions are not made this way because there are many stakeholders involved, with different 
interests and different rights and responsibilities. In such circumstances it might be more useful 
indeed to focus on different mechanisms (and institutions) by which these interests and rights can 
be accommodated.  
 
Financing mechanisms can be an integral part of such mechanisms. And it is not always 
necessary that the monetary valuation of an ecosystem function is known before a financial 
mechanisms can be implemented. However, what seems to be clear is that preferences and 
valuations of ecosystem functions are influenced by information. Specifically, information about 
the way ecosystem functions are provided (which institutional context) and the role ecosystem 
functions playCCCi.e. the benefits they generate. We will examine this in the next section. 
 
Even when the ecosystem functions that are provided (as well as the resource managers 
providing them) are clear and wellCestablished, the beneficiaries and potential demand party may 
not. Especially when the ecosystem function is a global one, identifying beneficiaries who are also 
willing to pay for the generated ecosystem function may not be clearCcut. Therefore, identifying 
who are the beneficiaries and who are willing and able to pay for the provision of services is one 
of the basic steps of establishing an innovative financing mechanism. Brousseau et al. (2007) 
identify two types of ‘orientation’: whether beneficiaries have individual or collective welfare as 
their goal. Individual welfare can be seen as private interests (e.g. when people visit a protected 
area for their own pleasure). Orientation to collective welfare is when people acknowledge that 
others are also affected by their actions (e.g. when they invest in forestry to reduce CO2). 
 
2.2 Information flows and valuation of ecosystem functions 
 
Information, knowledge and communication are important issues in maintaining ecosystem 
functions and implementing financing mechanisms. The willingness to contribute to maintaining 
ecosystem functions by beneficiaries (or their repersentatives) is shaped by what they know about 
the (importance of) ecosystem functions. This means that understanding ecosystem functions, 
how they relate to other vital parts of the ecosystems, their importance in sustaining human 
existence. Scientific research will play an important part in achieving this understanding. But 
research in itself is often not sufficient, because it will not lead to changes in political and societal 
behaviour. Scientific findings must also be communicated to the broader audience (see Box 1).  
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Box 1: Nobel prize for communication 
An inconvenient truth 
 
A good illustration of communication has been the work of Al Gore on the problem of climate 
change. The scientific findings of many scientists as well as the IPCC9 were ignored or contested 
by politicians for a long time, quoting a few dissenting scientists, belittling the problem, pointing 
out the great uncertainty of the scientific results and the huge economic costs that would have to 
be spent to tackle the problem. The work that Al Gore did was to communicate the scientific 
findings of the IPCC by publishing a book, going round the world giving presentations and finally 
making the movie “ an inconvenient truth” that then won an academy award. In 2007 he and the 
IPCC won the Nobel Peace prize "for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge 
about manCmade climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to 
counteract such change" (from the Nobel Prize report).  
 
 
Information and communication thus changes people’s ideas, knowledge, choices and 
preferences and as such may increase people’s willingness to contribute to ecosystems. But this 
is not the only function of information. Information and knowledge is also necessary to find 
solutions to problems (Brousseau et al., 2007). People may be willing to contribute to conserving 
an ecosystem under threat, but the question how is not always clear. Thus Brousseau et al. 
(2007) make a distinction between knowledge about issues and knowledge about solutions. The 
first is more oriented toward the establishment of (collective) preferences (i.e. willingness to pay), 
while the second is oriented toward the search for the most effective, equitable or efficient (less 
costly) way of addressing these issues (e.g. financing mechanisms).  
 
Knowledge on the importance of ecosystem functions is therefore crucial as the extent of 
knowledge on ecosystem functions is directly related to willingness to make available funds for 
ecosystem management and therefore impacts on the success of financing mechanisms. Thus, 
Brousseau et al. (2007) propose that before individuals and communities can express a 
willingness to pay, they have to know the (global) issues relating to provision of ecosystem 
functions and the conditions and costs of addressing these. This requires the development of 
knowledge to identifying ecosystem functions, understanding the complex web of causal 
relationships and discovering how best they can be delivered.  
 
A key element in this is conditionality. Wunder (2005) has identified two key obstacles for 
financing mechanism. The first is limited demand: too few service users are so confident about 
the mechanism that they are willing to pay — in some cases, because the link between land use 
and ecosystem functions is insufficiently understood or ambiguous. There are various aspects to 
this problem. First of all, a clear definition of the ecosystem function will be necessary to convince 
beneficiaries to contribute to ecosystem functions (Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). However, it might 
be difficult to define the ecosystem function. Especially concepts such as biodiversity, landscape 
or ecosystems are difficult to encapsulate into a specific set of indicators. Often broad and vague 
goals are set. Whitfield (2006: 908) illustrates this problem by stating that “most of Europe's agriC
environment schemes have very vague goals, such as to ‘prevent damage to the environment’ or 
‘provide wildlife habitats’. Specific targets are not set; progress is rarely monitored; the baselines 
from which they start are not defined. The good that they do is thus hard to measure, which in 
some eyes makes the schemes hard to justify”. This is essentially a problem of defining the 
function and therefore the funding may be compromised. Generally speaking, beneficiaries will be 
more inclined to pay for very specific ecosystem functions, as opposed to general conservation 
services. 
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The second problem that Wunder (ibid) has indicated, is that the link between the land use (input) 
and the provision of ecosystem functions (outcome) is insufficiently understood or ambiguous, the 
beneficiaries are not sufficiently confident about the outcome that they are willing to invest in input 
measures (see also Meijerink, 2007). Scientific modelling exercises simulating complex 
processes and showing the relation between input measures taken and expected outcomes may 
solve the problem. How important this is, can be illustrated by the political commotion when a 
study evaluated Dutch agriCenvironmental schemes and found them to be less effective than 
assumed (Kleijn et al. 2001). This led to a storm of discussion and possibly to reduced funding for 
such schemes (Whitfield 2006). 
 
2.3 Governance regimes managing ecosystems 
 
An important precondition for financing mechanisms is that a wellCfunctioning governance regime 
must be in place. If this is not the case, then either the willingness to pay or invest in ecosystem 
management may dissolve, or funds are mismanaged. One may make the argument that in order 
to have a wellCfunctioning governance sufficient funding is needed. What we will discuss here are 
the prerequisites that must be in place before financing mechanisms can be implemented. 
 
The governance regime10 that manages ecosystems in a sustaibale manner and that provides 
ecosystem functions, consists of a (i) property rights structure11 and (ii) a set of rules that 
determines how the nature area (ecosystem) is managed. The property rights system can take 
different forms (see Box 2). Within each property rights system, the right holders (i.e. those with 
ownership and user rights) establish a set of rules on how the natural area is managed, and on 
how user rights and responsibilties are distributed. These rules thus include the incentives, 
safeguards, dispute resolution processes and enforcement mechanisms that are used to control 
and coCordinate the actions of various selfCinterested parties (i.e. stakeholders) interacting in a 
bilateral and multilateral exchange relationship (cf. Kester, 1992). 
 
A forest for instance may have a common property rights system, and be managed by a 
community. But the rules (which can be formal and informal) in place on what is allowed by the 
members of the communty determines how well the forest is managed (see Ostrom, 1990). The 
rules may specify who has the right to hunt in the forest and when, or that members should plant 
trees in areas that they have cleared for agriculture. The rules also include enforcement 
mechanisms, which determine how well the rules are abided by12. These rules do not only 
determine the way the ecosystem is managed but also how equitable the outcomes are with 
respect to who reaps the benefits from the ecosystem and who bears the costs. Who has the 
authority to set or change the rules, who can use his or her power to appropriate benefits etc are 
alll issues that have to be taken into account. Rules are not value free.  
 
These rules may also be (partly) dictated by an overarching institutional environment. The 
government may, for instance, have banned the logging of certain species of trees, or determined 
the type of nets used in fishing. Sometimes these rules have been agreed in international 
agreements such as the CBD or Kyoto Protocol or within the framework of the European Union. 
Enforcement of the rules in place under the governance regime also relies on the provision made 
for this (e.g. court systems). 
 
The property rights system determines how property rights are allocated and thus to whom the 
financing mechanism is targeted. The rules in use to manage the ecosystem determines what kind 
of ecosystem functions and goods are supplies, and the quality. 
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Box 2: Property rights systems  
 
(1) State 
In a state governance regime, ownership and control over use rests in the hands of the state. 
Individuals and groups may be able to make use of the resources, but only at the forbearance of 
the state. National (or state) forests, national (or state) parks, and military reservations are 
examples of state governance regimes. Shifts from state property to other types, or vice versa, 
are 
possible.  
 
(2) Individual 
Individual property regimes are the most familiar, though of course much "individual" property is, 
in fact, coCowned by members of the family. Usually the best land in most settings has already 
been privatized and the worst has been left in the "public domain" 
 
(3) Commons 
Common property represents private property for the group (since all others are excluded from 
use and decision making). Individuals have rights (and duties) in a common property regime. 
Common property has something very much in common with private (individual) property CC 
exclusion of nonCowners; common property is corporate group property. The property owning 
groups vary in nature, size, and internal structure across a broad spectrum, but they are social 
units with definite membership and boundaries, with certain common interests, with at least some 
interaction among members, with common cultural norms, and often their own endogenous 
authority systems. Villages, communities, neighborhoods, transhumant groups, kin systems or 
extended families are all examples. These groupings hold customary ownership of certain 
resources such as farm land, grazing land, and water sources 
 
(4) open access (non3property)  
There are no property rights in an open access situation: "everybody's access is nobody's 
property." Whether it is a lake fishery, grazing forage, or fuelwood, a resource under an open 
access regime will belong to the party to first exercise control over it. If property and 
management arrangements are not determined, and if the investment is in the form of a capital 
asset such as improved tree species or range revegetation, the institutional vacuum of open 
access insures that use rates will eventually deplete the asset. 
 
Open access results from the absence CC or the breakdown CC of an authority system whose very 
purpose was to assure compliance with a set of behavioral conditions with respect to the natural 
resource. Valuable natural resources that are available to the first party to effect capture have 
become open access resources through a series of institutional failures that have undermined 
former collective management regimes. There is no authority in an openCaccess regime. 
Governments who have appropriated forests from localClevel management bodies CC primarily 
villages CC and have failed to manage them in an effective manner have created de jure state 
property, but de facto open access; the absence of effective management and enforcement has 
simply turned the forest into a resource that can be exploited on a firstcomeC firstCserved basis. 
This situation (sometimes incorrectly referred to as “tragedy of the commons”) is typical of many 
developing countries, where the institutional environment is weak. 
 
(Source: Bromley, 1992: 10C13) 
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A crucial element of governance regimes is thus the allocation of property rights. Property rights 
consist of the rights, or the powers to consume, obtain income from and separate from these 
assets. These rights are not constant; they are a function of the proprietors’ own direct efforts at 
protection, of other people's capture attempts, and of government protection (Barzel, 1989). In 
exchange (e.g. funding for ecosystem functions), property rights define sellers and buyers, the 
goods or services exchanged, the nature of funding, timing of transactions, enforcement and 
dispute resolution (Libecap, 2002). Murtough et al. (2002, cited in Whitten and Shelton, 2005) 
discern seven property right attributes that should be in place: 
1. Clearly defined: nature and extent of the property right is unambiguous. 
2. Verifiable: use of the property right can be measured at reasonable cost. 
3. Enforceable: ownership of the property right can be enforced at reasonable cost. 
4. Valuable: there are parties who are willing to purchase the property right. 
5. Transferable: ownership of the property right can be transferred to another party at 
reasonable cost. 
6. Low scientific uncertainty: use of the property right has a clear relationship with ecosystem 
functions. 
7. Low sovereign risk: future government decisions are unlikely to significantly reduce the 
property right’s value. 
 
A financing mechanism will not be sustainable or effective when these attributes are not in place. 
The question who has what property rights is important because it determines who is responsible 
for protecting and providing ecosystem functions as well as who should contribute to the costs. 
With ecosystem functions this is not always a simple matter because there are often multiple 
contributors (e.g. numerous farmers implementing soil conservation measures). If this is the case, 
the question arises which property regime is most suitable. For a long time it was believed (and 
sometimes still is) that the lack of individual property rights was one of the fundamental reasons 
of resource degradation. The idea behind this is that when resource managers (such as farmers) 
do not have property rights over resources (e.g. land), and are uncertain whether they can 
appropriate the revenues derived from that resource, they have no incentive to invest in that 
resource. It is not clear how property rights in governance regimes combined with financing 
mechanisms should be allocated in case of a (large) group of resource managers. The 
conventional approach seems to prefer private property rights (e.g. rewarding land owners) (Rosa 
et al., 2004). However, Larson & Bromley (1990) have shown that no specific property regime 
can be expected a priori to provide the solution to resource degradation and will lead 
automatically to resource conservation to provide ecosystem functions. It cannot be concluded 
that the resource manager values his or her resources more highly under one property regime 
than another. This issue plays an important role with respect to ongoing market initiatives to 
establish voluntary mechanisms to keep carbon stored in forests and peatlands (Diemont 
personnel communication).  
 
Alston et al. (1999) put forward that exchange is promoted through a broadening of the market 
beyond informal, local ownership arrangements. This means that for marketCbased financing 
mechanisms to be successful, more formal property rights will be necessary. This increases the 
role of the state, which retains certain rights or places restrictions on individual rights and is 
assumed to be able to enforce a new set of property rights (i.e. those defining ecosystem 
functions) (Larson and Bromley, 1990). An example of this is that tradable rights are defined and 
allocated by the government (e.g. in carbon emission or water). 
 
But an increased role for the government in defining and allocating rights is not always applicable 
in many parts of the world. The imposition of state control, either directly through the state 
ownership or indirectly through individual private property without the ability to enforce the 
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arrangements, has been an important factor in resource degradation. In that case, financing 
mechanisms to prevent resource degradation will clearly be ineffective. North (1990) has stated 
that transaction costs also arise in enforcing property rights. This will be especially true in the 
case where property rights are contested, or weakly enforced. Some alternative or additional 
mechanisms are necessary to be able to enforce property rights when a financing mechanism is 
involved. 
 
2.4 Institutional environment 
 
A second preCcondition for successful financing mechanisms is a wellCfunctioning institutional 
environment. We define the institutional environment (or institutional framework) as the system of 
formal laws, regulations, and procedures, and informal conventions, customs, and norms, that 
broaden, mould, and restrain socioCeconomic activity and behaviour. It is thus broader that a 
governance regime. An enabling institutional environment is therefore also often crucial for a 
governance regime but has broader implications for financing mechanisms.  
 
To be able to function effectively, a financing mechanism must be embedded in a wellCestablished 
institutional environment. For instance, establishing a CDM mechanisms requires certain 
institutions to be in place in the host country (Meijerink et al., 2004; Ruhweza and Masiga, 2007) 
such as a certification body, a court system that can deal with jurisdiction and resolve conflicts, 
and the country must be a signatory to an international convention. In some developing countries, 
this may be a bottleCneck13. The institutional environment not only establishes the context in 
which financing mechanisms can operate but also determines the economic conditions (e.g. 
opportunity costs and benefits). This leads to another important element of the institutional 
environment, which is the regulation that is put into place by governments. This regulation can 
establish a ‘level playing field’. If a certain activity is banned by law (e.g. logging in a forest), then 
this not only rules out any financing mechanism linked to this, but also decreases the opportunity 
costs of forest conservation. It also gives an incentive to stakeholders to engage in collective 
action, that on a voluntary basis would not have occurred. For instance, in January 2007 ten large 
US corporations called for measures to combat global warming (The Economist, 2007) – they did 
this to create a level playing field across the group to promote fair competition. 
 
A weak institutional environment can also lead to a weakened governance in a country14 leading 
to more corruption, and the prevalence of the interests of powerful groups in society. Kaufmann 
et al., (2007) distinguish six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. Inadequate governance usually has a detrimental effect on the management of 
ecosystems, which may fall prone to exploitation. It is the question to what extent financing 
mechanisms can be implemented in such a situation, and whether in general financing does not 
exacerbate bad governance. 
 
2.5 Transaction costs 
 
Transaction costs of financing mechanisms are important (Paavola, 2007). Transaction costs are 
defined as “the costs other than the money price that are incurred in trading goods or services” 
(Johnson, 2005). Before a particular mutually beneficial exchange can take place, at least one 
party must find out that there are other parties with which such a exchange is potentially possible, 
search out one or more such possible partners, inform them of the opportunity, and negotiate the 
terms of the exchange. All of these activities involve opportunity costs in terms of time, energy 
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and money. If the terms of the exchange are complicated (e.g. if the agreement involves such 
complications as funding in instalments, prefunding for future delivery, warranties or guarantees 
for quality, provision for future maintenance and service, options for additional future purchases at 
a guaranteed price, etc.), negotiations for such a detailed contract may itself be prolonged and 
very costly in terms of time, travel expenses, lawyers' fees, and so on. After an exchange has 
been agreed upon, there may also be significant costs involved in monitoring or policing the other 
party to make sure they are honouring the terms of the agreement (and, if they are not, to take 
appropriate legal or other actions to make them do so). In short, transaction costs include 
contact, contract & control (North, 1990: 28C33). 
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3 Analysis of Innovative Financing mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter we will analyze the knowledge questions that were put forward in chapter 1 with the 
information brought together in this study. We will review each knowledge question in turn.  
 
3.1 Financing mechanisms per function and level (local, regional, national and global) 
 
We cannot answer the question of which financing mechanism is most suitable for which function 
and at which level, when we do not take into account the governance regime (and thus also the 
property rights) that are in place to manage the ecosystem and the provision of environmental 
functions. Some environmental functions have a more public goods nature (they are enjoyed by 
many people who cannot be excluded and their enjoyment does not reduce the quantity and 
quality of the environmental function). Other environmental functions have a more private goods 
nature (people can be excluded from enjoying or using these functions and the use of the function 
reduces its availability).  
 
Self organized private market arrangements  
These financing mechanisms are expected to be implemented for functions that have a private 
good nature (such as timber) and thus have a high degree of excludability and rivalry (see Table 
1). Most production functions of ecosystems fall into this area, because they are tangible and thus 
can be traded in a market. The level (or scope) can be from local to international, depending on 
the market. It must be noted however, that when the level of the market becomes more wide 
(from local to international), the role of the government in setting the institutional environment 
conditions becomes more important. Although private parties may agree on a certain financing 
mechanism, such as certification, the legal framework for enforcement must be in place. At a 
 
Main points of this chapter 
• Almost all innovative financing mechanisms rely on an institutional environment and 
thus a wellCfunctioning government, except voluntary private, nonCmarket funding 
mechanisms that are less dependent on these. 
• Governments set the rules how markets function to achieve socially desirable results. 
For market mechanisms for ecosystem functions, the government therefore has a 
crucial role to play. 
• Scope, which we have defined as the distance between the provision of the 
ecosystem function and the beneficiaries (from local to global), influences the type of 
financing mechanism that is most appropriate. 
• Each type of financing mechanism has it (dis)advantages which must be assessed for 
each specific situation. There is not one mechanism that is most appropriate under all 
circumstances. 
• Poverty reduction is becoming increasingly an important factor in ecosystem 
management and protection. The issue of who has rights over what and receives 
funding thus is important in implementing financing mechanism s 
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local level, parties (with the help of local authorities) may sort out any conflicts they have with 
each other. At an international level, usually some type of formal legal system is necessary. 
 
Voluntary private, nonCmarket funding mechanisms  
These financing mechanisms are quite flexible, in the sense that they can be applied to any 
environmental function supplied by different governance mechanisms at different levels. However, 
one could expect that they play more at a local, regional and national level than an international 
level. Mechanisms such as lotteries often are not relevant at a global level. And one may expect 
that those willing to make private nonCmarket donations would do so to for a goal that is in close 
proximity so that they can see how the funding is used. However, for some functions that are of a 
global nature, such as biodiversity, international organisations such as the World Wildlife Fund or 
Greenpeace have been very succesful in rallying support (and funding). These organisations are 
wellCknown and trusted names. 
 
Government supported market creation  
This financing mechanism can be for any environmental function that is rival or not. For instance, 
the function of CO2 fixation (with market creation to trade carbon credits) is not rival, while timber 
production is (with market creation for sustainable timber trade). The important characteristic 
here is excludability. Creating a market means assigning property rights to particular functions 
that can be exchanged (“first allocate then trade”). This means that the environmental function 
must be excludable. The arrangement is most unproblematic on a national level. At a global level 
it means that different governments must come to an agreement on how a market is created and 
will function. As difficulties surrounding the Kyoto protocol shows, this is a fairly complex process.  
 
Government run financing mechanisms 
This financing mechanism is typical for environmental functions with a high public goods nature 
and thus with a low excludability and low rivalry. For these functions, creating markets is 
extremely difficult. Environmental functions with a public goods nature often fall into the category 
of externalities and are typically not rewarded. Thus government action is warranted. However, it 
must be stressed that even in cases concerning environmental functions with a high public goods 
nature, government action may be combined with more marketCbased instruments. This 
arrangement usually is relevant at a national level. 
 
3.2 Strong and weak points of each mechanism 
 
In this section we will briefly address the main strong and weak points of each mechanism. This is 
closely related to the obstacles and conditions of the mechanism, which will be discussed in 
section 5.1 and we have tried to avoid overlap. 
 
Self organized private market arrangements 
The strong point of this mechanism is that it links up beneficiaries of ecosystem functions with the 
providers of these services in a more or less direct way. The mechanism itself can be fairly 
straightforward (in the simplest case a contract), not needing much in terms of complex 
coordination mechanisms and thus keeping transaction costs relatively low.  
 
However, a weak point is that it usually relies on a wellCfunctioning institutional environment. This 
condition is not always present in developing countries. For instance, certification can only be a 
reliable mechanism when forgery can be avoided or dealt with, which requires an effective and 
efficient judicial system. A wellCfunctioning institutional environment is also necessary to protect 
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the rights of parties involved in the market arrangement. It is often the (poor) resource users that 
are relatively vulnerable to exploitation by more powerful market parties.  
 
Voluntary private, nonCmarket funding mechanisms 
Again, the strong point of this mechanism, like the one above is that it is fairly straightforward, 
linking beneficiaries with ecosystem function providers. In fairly simple mechanisms, the 
coordination costs and transaction costs can be kept low.  
 
A weak point is its voluntary nature, which may lead to fluctuations in the level of contributions. It 
may be difficult to achieve commitment from the beneficiaries who pay for ecosystem functions. 
They may lose interest at some point, or may be very sensitive to information (e.g. bad news).  
 
Government supported market creation 
The strong point of this mechanism is that it applies to public goods that are difficult to integrate 
into a market mechanism (between private parties). It uses the market mechanism to achieve 
efficiency, where hierarchical, top down governmentCled mechanisms would be bureaucratic and 
cumbersome.  
 
A weak point is related to its strong point in that this mechanism needs a capable government and 
also a wellCfunctioning institutional environment. This mechanism can only work when property 
rights over the ecosystem function can be delineated, allocated and traded. The institutional 
environment is crucial in protecting these rights. Not all developing countries can rely on such a 
wellCfunctioning institutional environment.  
 
A more general point about markets is that establishing markets may be a costly way to provision 
the good (Vatn et al., 2002). Markets may be the cheapest solution for allocating private goods, 
but not for others. The costs of exclusion may be very costly. 
 
Government run financing mechanisms but also the creation of an enabling environment 
The strong point of this mechanism is that it applies to (pure) public goods that have a high 
degree of nonCrivalry and nonCexcludability are difficult to integrate into any market mechanism. 
Basically this means that property rights are difficult to assign to beneficiaries15 and that therefore 
the government assumes responsibility for the beneficiaries in supporting (and financing) the 
ecosystem functions.  
 
A weak point is the incapability of the government to collect all information pertaining to the 
ecosystem functions such as preferences (and values) of people, costs of supplying the 
ecosystem function, the quality and quantity of ecosystem functions supplied etc. This is in 
general the common complaint about centralized decisions (Farrell, 1987), in that they cannot 
properly adjust to the special circumstances of each case. People have (private) information that 
affect decisions, which might not be available to a central authority. Governments are also not 
always the most efficient or effective when it comes to implementation and enforcement (e.g. they 
are prone to corruption or rent seeking). In short, besides market failure, there is also 
government or policy failure.  
 
3.3 Scope 
 
Scope or whether the ecosystem functions reaches many heterogeneous and distant beneficiaries 
(wide) or limited homogenous nearby beneficiaries (narrow) is important. If the scope is wide, it 
will result in higher costs of decisionCmaking (and for establishing a financing mechanism), and 
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more pertinent information needs (making the global community aware of the ecosystem functions 
and costs of supplying them). But at the same time it will reach more beneficiaries (Brousseau et 
al., 2007). Especially when ecosystem functions (such as biodiversity) cross national boundaries, 
implementing a financing mechanism that will manage contributions from abroad is difficult, as 
often an overarching governance regime is lacking. The overarching governance regimes consist 
usually of treaties to which different states are signatories (such as the CBD). When governance 
regimes are lacking, coercion or enforcement are difficult to implement, thus leading to free 
riding. To illustrate: the global community benefits without paying for efforts made by for example 
the Indian government and people to save the Indian tiger. 
 
Which financing mechanisms are appropriate for which functions and on what level (local, regional, 
national and global)? With respect to scope, local can be defined as being narrow in scope, while 
global as being wide in scope. As was described above, it is not in fact the physical distance that 
matters, but the scope of the governance regime, the communication between supplier and 
beneficiary of the ecosystem function (which become more difficult as distance increases), and in 
particular the power that the institutional environment has over implementation and enforcement 
of the particular financing mechanism (e.g. how well are property rights protected).  
 
Local level 
If the governance regime functions mainly at the local level, which is usually the case with private 
or common property regimes, and the beneficiaries are also local, it is easier to arrive at 
agreements as communication and enforcement are relatively easy. Work by Ostrom (1990) has 
shown that coercion can emerge spontaneously at the local level because, in certain 
circumstances, local communities can control the behavior of their members due to the stability 
of groups, the repetition of interactions, the high cost of exclusion through ostracism and the 
easy diffusion of information on the behaviors of members that sustain reputation effects. At the 
local level you would expect financing mechanisms such as: 
 self organized private market arrangements (a water using company pays farmers to 
maintain watershed) or  
 voluntary private, nonCmarket funding mechanisms (communities help to maintain a certain 
ecosystem).  
 
State intervention may only be necessary to protect rights, but for the rest relatively little 
involvement is to be expected. 
 
Regional level 
At the regional level, similar financing mechanisms as found on the local level may apply, although 
communication and enforcement become more difficult: 
 self organized private market arrangements (a water using company pays farmers to 
maintain watershed) or  
 voluntary private, nonCmarket funding mechanisms (communities help to maintain a certain 
ecosystem).  
 
The government may start playing a more important role in facilitating these. 
 
National level  
At the national level, the providers and suppliers of ecosystem functions emanating from 
ecosystems find it increasingly difficult to coordinate (i.e. communication and enforcement) 
financing mechanisms. Financing mechanisms found on this level are: 
 government supported market creation (e.g. a national system of tradable water rights)  
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 government run financing mechanisms and the creation of an enabling environment 
become important as  
 
However, with much improved communication and a wellCfunctioning enforcement system, 
distance between supplier and beneficiary of environmental functions becomes less important. 
Through various communication devices (such as the internet, newspapers, telephone, television) 
contact between suppliers and beneficiaries is facilitated. In such situations, we may also see 
financing mechanisms expected to be mainly found at local/regional levels: 
 self organized private market arrangements or  
 voluntary private, nonCmarket funding mechanisms.  
 
International level 
The main difficulty of the international level is enforcement: agreements between counties are 
notoriously difficult to enforce. Financing mechanisms that require a high level of government 
involvement is therefore difficult: on the international level there is no “supraCgovernment” that can 
implement and enforce these. Agreements signed between governments (such as the Kyoto 
protocol) may serve as 
 government supported market creation (e.g. CDM mechanism) 
 
As is the case at the national level, improved communication and a wellCfunctioning enforcement 
system may encourage more privateCled financing mechanisms: 
 self organized private market arrangements or  
 voluntary private, nonCmarket funding mechanisms.  
Again enforcement can be a problem. A citizen of country A may support the conservation of a 
certain ecosystem in country B, but has very little influence over how that ecosystem is managed, 
how property rights are protected etc. An example of this is that many citizens (in rich countries) 
are willing to support the conservation of endangered animals such as the tiger, panda, gorilla or 
the whale but that preventing another country or private parties within a country to destroy the 
habitat of those species is extremely difficult. It depends on the one hand on the strength of 
international agreements that are made and complied with (e.g. Japan and Norway failing in their 
controversial bid to overturn an international ban on the commercial trade in whales). On the other 
on the institutional environment in countries themselves (e.g. no system to define and enforce 
property rights over water, as is the case in many countries) and the capacity of countries to 
enforce rules (e.g. the existence of illegal logging in the Amazon that is against Brazil’s official 
rules). 
 
3.4 Poverty alleviation 
 
Emerton et al. (2006) observe a shift in official donor and government priorities away from 
biodiversity conservation and protected areas to poverty reduction, following the 2000 Millennium 
Summit and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. Most ODA16 has become 
closely tied to the implementation of countryClevel poverty reduction strategies and to investments 
which are perceived to contribute more directly to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 
Accordingly, international financial assistance for biodiversity conservation has become 
increasingly driven by social and economic objectives, and especially by its perceived ability to 
contribute to poverty reduction. This section addresses the issue of poverty alleviation by 
discussing (i) how the construction of the financial distribution mechanism is arranged, (ii) how the 
producers of the service can be involved and (iii) what is being paid for and what monitoring is 
necessary to verify that the service is being rendered.  
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To assess the the impact of innovative financing mechanisms on poverty, three questions should 
be asked (Pagiola et al., 2005): 
• Who are the actual and potential participants in the financing mechanism, and how many 
of them are poor? 
• What are the obstacles to the poor’s participation in the financing mechanism ? 
• What are the impacts of financing mechanism on participants? 
 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment has identified that some of the people and places affected 
by changes in ecosystems and ecosystem functions are highly vulnerable to the effects and are 
particularly likely to experience much of the damage to wellCbeing and loss of life that such 
changes will entail, while many others throughout the world benefit and prosper from human 
interactions with ecosystems17. Thus, the question of financing mechanisms cannot be viewed 
solely in terms of paying for maintenance costs of ecosystem management (such as demarcating 
boundaries, developing infrastructure, patrolling, research, monitoring). It must also encompass 
compensatory mechanisms to mitigate the impact of private, local benefits foregone, especially in 
developing countries (UNEP, 2003). 
 
Poverty issues tie in with the governance regime and the distribution of property rights as these 
specify who has a right to what and who has what responsibilty. With respect to this, it must be 
noted that the institutional environment again plays a role in enforcing these rights. And it is 
equally important in identifying who does not have any rights, or whose rights are violated. Often 
the rights of more powerful (and wealthy) interests groups prevail over those of weak, poor 
groups. Powerful and wealthy groups can usually lobby more effectively for their interests (up to 
paying bribes).  
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4 Examples of Innovative financing mechanisms 
 
 
 
This study will not list and discuss all the financing mechanisms available, as the list would 
become too long. There is much literature on different financing mechanisms. Meijerink (1995) 
identified and inventorised several financing mechanisms18 to manage and sustainable use forests 
(also applicable for other ecosystems) at the local, national and international level. In the 15 years 
since this report came out, these financing mechanisms still exist and have been expanded. But 
many new financing mechanisms have been developed. A quick search on Google demonstrates 
the scope of the amount of information there is on financing mechanisms combined with 
environmental or ecological services: it rendered 23.000 hits in December 2007. This shows that 
there is a multitude of information as well as initiatives available. For thorough and practical 
overviews we refer to WWF, which has compiled a guide of over 30 different financing 
mechanisms for species conservation (Koteen, 2004) and a survey of 52 financing options for 
sustainable natural resource management in developing countries (Gutman, 2003). The 
mechanisms cover both revenueCraising and economic incentive mechanisms as well as sources 
of revenue and are presented in Appendix 2. These are the most comprehensive overviews of 
(innovative) financing mechanisms we have found. IIED compiled a database of 284 projects in 
which different financing mechanisms were used for various ecosystem functions (LandellCMills 
and Porras, 2002) that distinguishes between five different ecosystem functions (See Figure 3). 
 
 
 Carbon sequestration (27% of projects) 
 Biodiversity conservation (25%) 
 Watershed protection (21%) 
 Landscape beauty (21%) 
 Bundled19 (10%) 
 
Biodiversity
Bundled
Carbon
Landscape
Watershed
 
Figure 3: Share of main ecosystem functions targeted by financing mechanisms  
(Source: LandellCMills and Porras, 2002) 
 
 
 
Main points of this chapter 
• There are a multitude of financing mechanisms available and in recent years many 
new mechanisms have been added 
• There is no oneCsizeCfitsCall approach possible as each financing mechanism is tailored 
to a specific situation, taking into account the ecosystem function, governance 
regime, institutional environment, scope and types of beneficiaries. 
• Different ecosystem functions can be combined (‘bundled’) under one financing 
mechanism 
• Beneficiaries often pay through other parties such as government, donors or 
(international) organizations who play an important role in financing mechanisms 
• Revised or new regulation, laws etc can generate new financing mechanisms 
• The private sector is actively involved in financing mechanisms. Innovations in 
financing mechanisms may be expected especially from the private sector, but only 
when ecosystem functions can generate (short term) profits. 
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4.1 Some innovative financing mechanisms 
 
In this section we will focus on a few innovative financing mechanisms that have been developed 
and implemented. We claim by no means to be exhaustive. 
 
4.1.1 Adopt an acre of rainforest20 
 
This is an example of a voluntary private, nonCmarket funding mechanism. The Rainforest in 
Cocobolo Nature Reserve in Panama is a mixture of lowland and submontane neotropical 
rainforest of over 1000 acres (over 400 ha). There are over 300 species of birds including 
endangered species that are rare or extinct in other areas of Panama. Also highly endangered 
species like Harlequin frogs C extinct in western Panama, pumas, jaguars, tapirs and at least four 
species of monkey including the endangered spider monkey, can be found in the area. But even 
though these forests are home to highly diverse flora and fauna, they are not immune from the 
threats of hunting and illegal logging. 
 
The NGO CREA is currently protecting Cocobolo Nature Reserve by demonstrating the importance 
of conservation to local communities and as an educational resource for school groups and 
visitors. CREA provides training to subsistence farmers to find sustainable alternatives to 
traditional slash and burn practices. Within Cocobolo Nature Reserve is CREA’s field school where 
school groups and local communities participate in educational activities. In one area of the 
reserve, CREA has set up an agricultural demonstration farm that shows ways in which agriculture 
can comply with local ecological systems. The purpose of Cocobolo Nature Reserve is to 
primarily protect habitat for biodiversity while aiding local communities to develop local solutions 
for specific agricultural practices that increase wildlife habitat, food production and protect 
remaining forests simultaneously. 
 
CREA has found an innovative way to obtain funds for their activities by setting up a ‘adopt an 
acre’ scheme, in which people all over the world can become a ‘guardian’ of an acre of rainforest 
within Cocobolo Nature Reserve. The donation is used for: 
1) The conservation and protection of Cocobolo Nature Reserve by employing local forest 
rangers;  
2) Providing farmer training and conservation activities for local communities; 
3) Increasing the educational capacity of Cocobolo Nature Reserve by producing educational 
materials  
 and developing programs 
Each guardian will receive confirmation of the adoption by email and an eCcertificate that can be 
printed. The guardian will also receive periodic newsletters about the Rainforest and his/her name  
with a photo will be represented on the Guardians section in this website. 
 
The donations asked for are 36 US$ or 26€ to CREA to become the guardian of 1 acre of 
Rainforest for one year. The procedure is simple and entails low transaction costs. Donations can 
be made by going to either the website of Charity Choice (UK based) or Network for Good (US 
based), which are both webCbased guides (or brokers) to various charities which allows users 
worldCwide to access over 10,000 charities and nonCprofit organizations. The Charity Choice 
online donations service uses an advanced encryption technology provided by Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL), a recognized authentication and encryption software. The Network for Good giving 
states that it meets “the BBB Wise Giving Alliance standards for for charity accountability” and has 
received more than $100 million dollars in contributions from around 400,000 donors.  
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Both Charity Choice and Network for Good lower transaction costs by making it easy to donate. 
But because they are respectively British and US based, they rely on the strong institutional 
environments and legal systems of Great Brittain and the US and can guarantee security of 
funding. Thus relying on these organisations, CREA does not need to rely on the institutional 
environment of Panama, which may be less reliable21.  
 
Using the Internet, CREA can disseminate information about conservation activities and other 
‘guardians’ in a fast and relatively cheap way. Through emails guardians are kept informed. These 
again lower transaction costs and are an effective way of communication.  
 
 
4.1.2 Financing mechanism emanating from carbon markets 
 
This is an example of a government supported market creation. The Kyoto Protocol outlines three 
types of marketCbased mechanisms: emissions trading, Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). Emissions trading allows the 39 governments committed to 
collective reductions under the Protocol to trade the right to pollute among themselves. Under 
this scheme, due to start in 2008, a country may choose to buy emission credits from another 
country that has managed to reduce its emissions below its Kyoto targets. 
 
The CDM has two main objectives: 
1. To assist developing countries who host CDM projects to achieve sustainable 
development. 
2. To provide developed countries with flexibility for achieving their emission reduction 
targets. by allowing them to take credits from emission reducing projects undertaken in 
developing countries. 
 
The CDM mechanism provides developing countries with an additional source of income through 
an ecosystem function: carbon sequestration. The market as it is now emerging is still in its 
infancy. As for any market, prices will depend largely on supply and demand relations and the 
risks involved. The possibility of getting paid for carbon management is expected to stimulate 
environmental protection and conservation and is expected to be beneficial for social 
circumstances as well. The implementation of the trade mechanisms and how this will benefit the 
local poor will differ per region. The Kyoto agreement has triggered several carbon trade 
initiatives22. 
 
Besides the financial initiatives linked to carbon, the UNFCCC agreed in 2001 to establish new 
funds to support technology transfer, capacity building, and adaptation planning in developing 
countries. More specifically, these are the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed 
Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund. The Adaptation fund receives part of the money via a 2% 
charge of the Certified Emission Reductions from CDM projects.  
 
All funds are ready to receive money from industrialized countries but so far these money flows 
have not materialized. There are two reasons for this. First, Heller and Shukla (2003) argue that 
there is only marginal potential for development related work via CDM projects. There remain 
uncertainties about the rules and practices governing the certification of projects. And perhaps 
more significantly, the removal of U.S. demand for mitigation has depressed prices for all 
emissions trading programs, including CDM23. Second, CDM and development are not a good 
mix. Targets and priorities are set by industrialized countries and designed to engage developing 
countries in climate change regimes. Steering investments and technologies toward a more 
climate friendly development can however have a positive contribution to development. A critical 
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case to test the potential for CDM in the development process is Africa. Lecocq and Capoor 
(2003) show that the volumes are low and only a few projects also include development priorities.  
 
So far limiting carbon emission from deforestation is not taken into account in the Kyoto treaty. 
Deforestation is the single most important source of emission24. In the period 2000C2005 7.3 
million ha (nett) was deforested. In the short term carbon mitigation benefits from deforestation 
are greater than from afforestation (Nabuurs, 2007). The issue is whether deforestation will be 
taken on board by the UNFCCC. To date, various structures have been proposed for a mechanism 
for providing positive incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) 
in developing countries. In order to be effective, the mechanism must continually generate money 
and create incentives for landCuse activities that reduce or avoid deforestation and degradation. 
Ogonowski et al. (2007) identify two types of REDD mechanisms: 
1. A marketCbased approach that would allow developing countries undertaking voluntary actions 
that reduce their deforestation rate or maintain carbon stocks to generate carbon credits, 
which they can sell at a marketCdetermined price per tonne CO2e reduced. Most current 
proposals envision this market mechanism to be linked to a ‘postC2012’ carbon market 
envisioned as an extension of the existing carbon market created under the Kyoto Protocol. In 
such a system, credits generated from REDD actions would be equivalent to ‘postC2012’ 
carbon credits (e.g., those generated through the CDM or its successor) and could be traded 
along with or in place of such credits. 
2. NonCmarket approaches that would rely on contributions to a fund or funds from developed 
country governments and sources such as through official development assistance (ODA), 
international financial institutions, and the private sector. For the REDD mechanism, financing 
is then distributed from this fund to activities that either reduce deforestation or reward 
countries for successful forest protection. Contributions could be either voluntary or 
mandatory.  
 
The most likely options are peat forests in SE Asia (Silvius & Diemont in prep). Also private 
initiatives underway now being discussed could provide options to link finance options for both 
biodiversity and carbon conservation, while improving the income for local poor people through 
mechanisms such as BioCrights, where local people are compensated through alternative income 
opportunities and microCcredits for their opportunity costs (www.bioCrights.com).  
 
A mechanism related to REDD is the system of “Voluntary stock carbon credits”. This system is 
being developed by Global Eco Investment and backed by venture capital. Funding is based on the 
available carbon stock in tropical forests. The price of these C not yet accredited C credits will be 
determined by the market. There are interested parties in the market ready to buy these carbon 
stock credits. The system has been launched before the Bali Conference and more details on how 
the system operates are evolving. 
 
4.1.3 Farming for Nature25 
 
Farming for nature is a policy instrument that supports farmers who are confronted with low 
prices due to changes in the Common Agricultural Policy by offering them the opportunity to 
switch from intensive farming towards extensive farming systems. Farmers’ original incomes are 
compensated by agriCenvironmental measures. These are funding for green (improved landscape 
and biodiversity) and blue (water retention and conservation) services. The compensation is on an 
annual base and can be as high as 1000 euro per ha. This high funding for agriCenvironmental 
services demonstrates that there is a high demand for these kind of services in Dutch society. 
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Around 20 percent of the Netherlands (720,000 ha) is designated now as nature area by the 
government. Most is concentrated in the National Ecological Framework (EHS), which is also more 
or less the Dutch contribution to Natura 2000 as agreed by the EU. In the EHS about half of the 
land is forest (planted on former heathlands) and the other half is arable land, grassland and 
meadows. The base area of the EHS are existing nature reserves including forest and heathlands 
and meadows to support the meadow birds. The policy of the government in the early 1990s was 
also to buy all private agricultural land within the EHS, but this policy has changed because policyC
makers believe that farmers should to be involved. 
 
In 1995, farmers in Gaasterland (an area of 500 ha and one of the proposed areas of the EHS) 
did not agree to sell their land. They wanted to continue farming taking on board the public 
demand to generate more biodiversity in agricultural land. Farming for Nature is somewhat 
different from other approaches such as in Gaasterland. Its focus is on continuation of farming but 
with provision of services such as nature, landscape and conservation of water resources.  
 
The income generated for farmers in the Farming fore Nature concept is about the same as other 
agriCenvironmental funding systems (SN and SAN) applied in Gaasterland and elsewhere in the 
EHS. The difference is that in Farming for Nature the ministry shares the costs with local 
stakeholders. In Farming for Nature the ecological prerequisites (water level; level of 
nutrients/manure allowed) are included in the farming system. This provides more freedom for the 
farmerCentrepreneur and probably also more sustainable results for biodiversity and landscape. 
 
Farming for Nature experiments sponsored by the ministry and local interest groups are ongoing 
in the polder region (Polder van Biesland; 100 ha) and in the sandy part of the country in the 
Twickel estate (1000 ha). Within Interreg projects other Farming for Nature projects are in 
progress.  
 
Another interesting case is the ‘farm estate de Bleek’. The concept of a farm estate was invented 
by the municipality of Boxtel taking on board the Farming for Nature approach. Financing is 
through a compensation mechanism called ‘ red for green’. In the case of ‘red for green’ 
financing, the project is achieved by compensation funding for depreciation of the value of the 
farm land as this land is allocated in the future in the zoning plan as nature area. This change in 
land use causes a depreciation of the land value of about 25,000 euro per ha. The financial 
compensation is provided by allowing to build one or more landscape friendly houses in the farm 
estate. In a region where housing is permitted land costs 300 euro/m3 as compared to 3 euro/m3 
for agricultural land. The interesting issue here is that the farm estate concept allows to combine 
farming in a 30 ha farm (outside the EHS) with arable land with the management of 1000 ha of 
heathland (Kampina nature reserve). The presence of what is now a nature reserve (Kampina) is of 
vital importance for the extensive beef producing farm, whereas the private arable land outside 
the EHS is important to grow sufficient fodder crops.  
 
In conclusion a few remarks. There is a high demand for nature in The Netherlands, which 
provides new opportunities for farming. But already now farmers manage a lot of grassland and 
heathlands in public owned nature areas. If these farmers disappear due to changes in the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy also nature conservation will be badly affected. Now farmers are even 
paying nature organisations to allow their cattle to graze grassland and heath in the public nature 
reserves. In case farmers abandon there farm there will no longer be a net income from the farm 
to nature organisations. Without farmers there is no longer an income for nature conservation 
organisations, but a cost of of 1000 euro per ha to maintain grasslands designated as Natura 
2000 area. Farming for Nature is a tool for both rural policy and achieving goals of Natura 2000. 
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Recently the EU administration has agreed with the funding mechanism developed for Farming for 
Nature as far as the demonstration farms are concerned. 
 
4.1.4 BioCrights26 
 
BioCrights is an innovative financial mechanism that combines sustainable livelihood development 
and environmental conservation. By providing incentives to poor local communities for conserving 
their natural environment, BioCrights reverses the ongoing pattern of environmental degradation 
that increasingly threatens livelihoods and economies around the globe.  
 
BioCrights is based upon three simple but powerful elements: 
Step 1. Local communities receive microCcredits for development of sustainable income 
generating activities. 
Step 2. Communities don't repay their loan and associated interest by financial means, but 
instead pay interest in the form of conservation services, such as reforestation, habitat 
protection and alteration of unsustainable practices. 
Step 3. MicroCcredits are converted into grants, and subsequently into communityCbased revolving 
funds for sustainable development, once conservation measures prove successful and 
sustainable. 
 
Combined with well established natural resource management activities such as awareness 
raising, training and community empowerment, this innovative approach renders high levels of 
efficiency and sustainability, extending well beyond those of many ongoing conservation and 
development initiatives.  
 
The BioCrights initiative has been established to address the following issues: 
• Unsustainable practices resulting from poverty are a driving force behind nature degradation, 
climate change and biodiversity loss. 
• Environmental degradation in turn leads to loss of natural resources and poverty. 
• The negative loop of poverty and nature degradation causes increasingly severe social and 
environmental problems and economic losses at international scale. 
 
An integrated multiCsectoral approach is needed to solve these problems. BioCrights is a tool to 
accomplish this. BioCrights' integrative approach brings along a range of distinct advantages: it 
improves livelihoods of local communities in a sustainable way and at the same time safeguards 
nature's environmental functions for future generations. The mechanism also builds awareness 
among local stakeholders with regard to sustainable natural resource management. As such BioC
rights unifies the priorities and needs of local communities, conservationists, development 
organizations, governments and the corporate and finance sector. 
 
The approach is of interest to all stakeholders that deal with people or natural resources. The 
concept might directly suit the business needs of the corporate sector. It might as well comply 
with corporate responsibility and global obligations such as reduction of greenhouse gases. For 
governmental bodies it might be a tool to combat largeCscale problems such as climate change 
and biodiversity loss and to target objectives stated in the UN Millennium Development Goals. For 
conservation and development organizations, BioCrights provides an innovative multiCsectoral 
approach to complex socioCenvironmental issues. 
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4.1.5 Trust Funds 
 
Trust Funds are not new but are receiving more attention as a sustainable financing mechanism. 
The WWF27 states that (conservation) trust funds provide an investment avenue that can be used 
to finance program costs over many years. Trust funds also establish the administrative and 
management mechanisms that help involve local people and enable nonCgovernmental 
organizations to work together with government agencies to carry out conservation activities. By 
providing sustainable funding, building local capacity, and encouraging stakeholder coordination, 
conservation trust funds can greatly enhance the impact of conservation investments. 
 
A trust fund can be broadly defined as a financial asset that fulfils three criteria: 
1. is legally restricted to a specified purpose;  
2. must be kept separate from other sources of money (such as a government agency's regular 
budget); and  
3. is managed by an independent board of trustees or directors. Depending on the legal system 
of the country, trust funds can be established as foundations, nonprofit corporations, 
commonClaw trusts, or special institutions.  
 
Trust funds can be financed by debt swaps, through grants or donations, or through other 
financing mechanisms such as earmarked taxes and fees. There are three primary types of trusts 
funds: an endowment fund (where the interest, but not the capital is spent); a sinking fund (where 
the income and part of the capital is spent every year, eventually sinking the fund to zero over a 
preCdetermined time); and a revolving fund (which continually receives new revenues from 
earmarked taxes or fees and continually spends these revenues). 
 
An alternative to a trust fund is the “regional account” that has been implemented in the 
Netherlands28. The objective of the Regional Account in the Province NoordCBrabant is to generate 
financial means for sustainable management of Het Groene Woud, a green area between the 
cities of Tilburg, Eindhoven and den Bosch which was designated a national Landscape by the 
Dutch government in 2005.  
 
The concept of the Regional Account is simple but attrative. It allows people, public institutions 
and the private sector to contribute towards the sustainable development of Het Groene Woud, by 
opening a special savings account at the bank (an Isis Account), and depositing a certain amount. 
ASN donates 0.15% of the total savings to the Horus Fund. This is the fund from which innovative 
projects that ensure the sustainability and quality of Het Groene Woud can apply for financial 
support (as of the 1st of January 2008). The customer receives the market rate of interest and the 
usual facilities for withdrawal of the deposit. However, customers can choose to donate their 
interest to Het Groene Woud.  
 
A costCbenefit analysis done for Het Groene Woud has shown that every euro invested has a return 
of three euros. In July 2006, already 34 million Euro was pledged in savings. This approach is 
also interesting for the ASN bank in getting new customers. Plans are being made to also make 
possible to save via the internet. 
 
 
4.1.6 Shares in conservation projects29 
 
A very innovative financing mechanism consisting of conservation sanctuaries financed by shares 
that were traded in the stock market was developed by Earth Sanctuaries Ltd (ESL) in Australia. 
The Earth Sanctuaries Ltd was set up in 1985 by John Wamsley to provide a private sector 
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vehicle for the conservation of biodiversity, specifically mammals. It set up 10 sanctuaries 
spanning around 90.000 hectares. Several endangered species were bred in captivity. The 
company was listed on the Australian Stock Exchange in 2000. To fund its activities, ESL involved 
in a number of income generating activities, such as ecotourism, provision of consultancy and 
services (such as the removal of feral species from private properties) and the sale of nonC
endangered captive animals. The sanctuaries thus provided both a mix of private and public 
functions. 
 
However, by early 2002, the company faced a number of major problems that threatened its 
survival, including difficulties relating to the uniqueness of its business model, cashCflow 
management, the process of securing capital from external investors and an overly ambitious 
growth agenda. Since ELS had listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, the prices of its shares 
decreased progressively. Many investors found that it was not a particularly appealing investment 
because the potential profits and earnings growth was perceived as being some years in the 
future. ShortCterm returns were unlikely and revenue was almost nonCexistent. In 2005, it spent 
$1.5 million more than it earned, and despite raising $30 million, the company could not continue 
without a further cash injection of $10 million. The company was delisted in 2005. 
 
We have included this financial mechanism because there are some important lessons. First of all, 
it is very difficult to set up such a financial mechanism for ecosystem functions that are essentially 
public goods which do not generate any (immeidate) financial revenues. For instance, a difficulty in 
promoting private conservation efforts in Australia stems from the prohibition on the sale of 
captive bred native species. It is also problematic if the public sector provides access to 
substitutable biodiversity resources via national parks and reserves at close to zero cost. 
Moreover, such parks and reserves receive subsidised infrastructure provision and have most of 
their operating costs met from the public purse. Markets for viewing (rare) flora and fauna are 
narrow and there is simply not a sufficiently 'level playing field' for initatives such as ESL to 
survive.  
 
4.1.7 Venture Capita30 
 
Several initiatives involving venture capital have been established the past decade (LandellCMills 
and Porras, 2002). We highlight one – the Canadian Global Environment Emerging Markets Fund 
(GEEMF). This venture capital intermediary makes equity investments in environmentCoriented 
companies, projects and privatizations in emerging market countries, with a particular focus on 
environmental infrastructure and environmental municipal services such as clean energy (small 
hydro, natural gasCfired power, natural gas/LPG distribution), clean water (potable water treatment 
and delivery, wastewater treatment for municipalities and industry), and waste management. 
GEEMF especially seeks coCinvestment opportunities with established operating companies 
engaged in joint venture or other operational partnerships with local firms serving environmentC
related industries in eligible emerging market countries. Investment size generally ranges up to 
$10 million, though can on occasion be greater.  
 
Its regions include Region: NIS as well as emerging markets in Asia, Latin America, Europe, the 
Middle East, and Africa. The Fund aims at operating companies or projects with demonstrated 
cash flows, significant longCterm revenue growth potential, and high anticipated margins of profits 
from operations. Projected rates of return to the investor should substantially exceed the current 
riskCfree return available in individual markets, with additional consideration for risks related to the 
volatility and convertibility of currency and the degree of liquidity for the investor.  
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This example shows that venture capital in environmental projects look for “high anticipated 
margins of profit” and therefore are not very attractive for ecosystem functions that have a public 
goods nature. 
 
4.2 Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to highlight a few innovations in financing mechanisms for ecosystem 
management. By no means it has tried to be complete or has meant to convey the message that 
‘old’ financing mechanisms are no longer relevant. The innovative financing mechanisms seem to 
arise out of two innovations. First a revision in legislation such as in the case of agriCenvironmental 
schemes or new provisions under the Kyoto Protocol (or the Bali agreement). Second, the 
involvement of the private sector which is often linked to also financial innovations, such as the 
venture capital example or the shares in sanctuaries listed at the Australian Stock Exchange. 
 
New or adapted legislation is often crucial for the emergence of innovative financing mechanisms 
because it either enables these to emerge, creates a level playing field or enables the creation of 
monetary value of ecosystem services that can be traded. But legislation alone is not enough – a 
well functioning institutional environment is necessary to implement and enforce this. Thus it is the 
question whether these can be implemented in developing countries with weak enforcement 
capacity. 
 
The involvement of the private sector seems to feasible only in case there are financial returns to 
the ecosystem managementCCCsuch as ecotourism, selling of goods (animals, timber, or other 
products). For ecosystem functions with a public goods nature where such financial returns are 
not possible, financial innovations linked to the private sector seem improbable. 
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5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we will lay out some conclusions that were derived from the previous chapters and 
provide some “best bets” or pointers for implementing innovative financing mechanisms for 
ecosystem management. We would like to stress that the list of pointers is by no means 
exhaustive. 
 
5.1 Obstacles and conditions for successful implementation to ecosystem 
management 
 
In setting out how innovative financing mechanisms are embedded in the institutional environment 
and linked to governance regimes and beneficiaries (in chapter 2: The context and preconditions 
of innovative financing mechanisms), we already discussed some conditions as well as obstacles. 
In this section we will bring these together and focus on the main ones that are related to 
innovative financial mechanisms. 
 
We have established that the type of governance regime of ecosystems is important for 
ecosystem management. In essence, governance regimes exists of a property rights system 
and the rules in place that regulate how the ecosystem is managed. The main obstacles and 
condition for successful implementation to ecosystem management lie in these two issues.  
 
First, unclear or unprotected property rights often lie at the basis of most environmental 
destruction (Pearce and Turner, 1990; Heltberg, 2002). It is important to note that rights on 
paper (de jure) are not sufficient. The actual implementation and enforcement of those rights (de 
facto) are crucial and require a wellCfunction institutional environment (e.g. judicial system). The 
type of property rights system does not a priori define the success of ecosystem management: a 
state owned ecosystem may be managed just as well as an individually owned ecosystem. 
However, the type of property rights system should fit the type of ecosystem and the 
type of services and goods it produces. Vatn et al. (2002) make the point that while private 
goods may be provisioned under a variety of systems, public goods seem to demand some type 
of public property rights system (thus state or common property rights ) and funding structure if 
they are to be produced at all.  
 
Having set out this first set of conditions, it is easy to see that the obstacles for successful 
implementation to ecosystem management consist of situation where these conditions are not in 
place. In many developing countries property rights are not always wellCdefined or have eroded 
through the influence of powerful elites. Especially the property rights of poor communities 
over local resources are often not well3protected and prone to capture by more 
powerful groups. Ecosystems that were once managed in a sustainable way become de facto 
open access resources, or have become the de facto property of other groups. It is often the 
governments who have an important role in protecting the property rights. But difficulties in 
mending such situations arise when members of the government have an interest in capturing 
rights over certain resources.  
 
Secondly, clear rules must be in place that define not only who has what rights but also what 
responsibilities with respect to the management of the ecosystem, but also on how the 
ecosystem is managed. These rules will differ per ecosystem and per group of resource 
 31 
managers, and there is not “one size fits all” prescription possible. Common property resources 
are often difficult to manage, as rules must be agreed on and enforced by a number of people – 
i.e. depend on collective action. Ostrom (1990) has outlined several successful cases in which 
this was achieved. 
 
Rules will be successful when the incentives for sustainable management are aligned 
with the interests of the resource managers (i.e. all stakeholders involved in the 
management). There has been a growing literature on this, making use of game theoretic 
situations (Ostrom et al., 1994). The famous prisoners’ dilemma in which two prisoners do not 
cooperate and end up in a secondCbest situation has been thought to apply to many (common 
pool) resource management problems. For instance, two fishers may agree on keeping a certain 
quota of fish that will achieve sustainability, but each has an incentive in secretly fishing a bit 
more. If both do this then they will end up in an unsustainable situation. The ability of stakeholders 
to come to agreements, communicate and enforce agreements is crucial in the success of 
ecosystem management. The larger the number of stakeholders involved, the more important 
formal rules become, as well as mechanisms that can enforce these. A small group of 
stakeholders may not need these and can function well with more or less informal rules. Cultural 
preferences are an important factor in how these rules are formed. 
 
Transaction costs play an important role in whether the rules in place lead to sustainable 
management of ecosystems. Transaction costs consist of: 
 Contact costs consist of finding and exchanging information between people who want to 
agree on some transaction.  
 Contract costs refers to the specific agreements that are made between the people in the 
context of a transaction. 
 Control costs entails the subsequent monitoring and enforcement of these agreements. 
Transaction costs usually consist of time and energy spent on contact, contract and control and 
can often not be measures in monetary terms. This may be one reason why they are often 
overlooked. However, transaction costs are important in determining whether a certain set of 
rules that are in place are successful. If the time and energy spent on applying these rules are too 
high for stakeholders, they will abandon them or search for other rules. 
 
The rules in place are not only important in determining the sustainability of ecosystem 
management, but also in determine how equitable the management is. Who reaps what benefits 
(e.g. from an innovative financing mechanism) is determined by these rules. If they lead to 
inequitable outcomes, people who are disadvantaged may start pushing for change. 
 
Information is crucial in several  
5.2 “Best bets”  
Based on the previous paragraphs we will assess what mechanisms have the best perspective to 
be introduced and under which conditions. We have found that the institutional environment is a 
crucial factor in determining the successfulness of mechanisms, even in the case of self 
organised private market arrangements.  
 
So what to do when the institutional environment is not conducive? Then a mechanism which is 
least dependent on the institutional environment is the best bet, which would be voluntary private, 
nonCmarket funding mechanisms. The CREA example illustrates this well. It relies on webbased 
mechanisms that are embedded not in the institutional environment of Panama, which may be less 
reliable but in the more reliable institutional environments of the UK and US. 
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If we assume that the institutional environment is functioning and reliable, the question is which 
mechanism constitutes another “best bet”. There is a tendency among economists to favor 
market transactions and market allocations in general. Vatn et al. (2002: 6) observes “a search 
for finding ways to privatize the provisioning of public good attributes either in the form of 
constructing or mimicking some market allocations or by establishing various types of ‘clubs’. 
This has for example fostered a search for ways in which tourists may pay for landscape 
experiences via hotel prices or toll on roads.” But they note that “ there is nothing inherent in 
markets or clubs that should give them any a priori superiority.” For them the criteria that will help 
decide which mechanism is most appropriate are the transaction costs involved: that transaction 
costs vary between types of goods and types of regimes (Bromley, 1991). Thus marketCbased 
mechanisms may be the best solution for certain private ecosystem functions but not for others. 
This is in the line with institutional economics literature, which postulates that the financing 
mechanism chosen (in this case financing mechanims) depends on the transaction costs involved 
in that arrangement (Williamson, 1998). 
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6.1 Appendix 1: NGOs, international organizations, and GAAs involved in funding ecosystem 
management 
 
1. CARE 
2. Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) 
3. Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza (CATIE) 
4. Conservation International (CI) 
5. Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) 
6. DirectorateCGeneral for International Cooperation (DGIS) of theNetherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
7. Edinburgh Centre for Carbon Management 
8. Forest Trends 
9. Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
10. German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) 
11. InterCAmerican Development Bank (IDB) 
12. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
13. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) 
14. IUCN–The World Conservation Union 
15. Katoomba Group 
16. Rewarding the Upland Poor in Asia for Ecosystem functions They Provide (RUPES) 
17. The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 
18. United Kingdom Department for International Development, Forestry Research Programme (DFID) 
19. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
20. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
21. Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) 
22. Winrock International 
23. World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) 
24. The World Bank 
25. WWF 
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6.2 Appendix 2: Overviews of Financing mechanisms for nature conservation 
 
A: Financing species conservation 
 
Financing mechanism Source of Revenue 
Government Revenue Allocations   
  Taxes and Bonds Earmarked for Conservation  Taxpayers, investors 
  Real Estate and Development Taxes  Property owners, property developers 
  Lottery Revenues  Gamblers 
  PremiumCPriced Motor Vehicle License Plates  Vehicle owners 
  Wildlife Stamps  Postal customers, hunters and fishers 
 
 Economic Instruments to Stimulate Environmental 
Investment  Investors 
  Debt Relief  Donors, governments, NGOs 
 Grants, Donations, and Loans   
  Bilateral and Multilateral Agencies  Donor agencies 
  Foundations  Individuals, corporations 
  Conservation Trust Funds  MultiCsource 
  Nongovernmental Organizations  NGO members and supporters 
  Private Sector  Private companies 
 Tourism Revenues   
  Protected Area Entry Fees  Visitors to protected areas 
  Recreation Fees  Users of additional protected area resources 
  Species Related “User Fees”  Wildlife reviewers 
  Hunting Fees and Green Safaris  Hunters, wildlife sportsmen 
  Commercial Operations in Protected Areas  Tourism operators, tourists 
  Airport Passenger Fees and Hotel Taxes  Tourists 
 
 Voluntary Contributions from Tourists and Tourism 
Operators  Tourists, tourism operators 
 Revenue from the Sale and Trade of Wildlife   
  Revenue from Illegal Hunting and Wildlife Trade  Hunters, wildlife traders 
  Wildlife Auctions  Game parks, private purchasers 
  In SituCEx Situ Species Conservation Partnerships  Zoo agencies 
  Species Product Certification  Consumers 
 Financing Habitat Acquisition and Management   
  Purchase or Donation of Land or Property  Property owners, donors 
  Conservation Easements  Property owners, donors 
  Wildlife Conservancies  Property owners 
  Conservation Concessions  Conservation investors 
  Tradable Development Rights and Wetland Banking  Property developers 
 Natural Resource Extraction Revenues   
  Fines  Natural resource extraction companies 
  Royalties and Fees  Natural resource extraction companies 
  Taxes  Natural resource extraction companies 
  Hydroelectric Power Revenues  Power producers 
 
 Voluntary contributions from natural resource 
companies  Natural resource extraction, power companies 
For profit investment  
 Market investments promoting species biodiversity Private investors 
(Source: Koteen, 2004) 
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B: 52 Financing Options for sustainable natural resource management 
 
Mostly public funding 
1 Public budget funding of SNRM projects and programs  
2 Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more general taxes collected at the national, 
state, or local level  
3 Special laws delivering extraCbudgetary financial support to particular social groups, geographical areas, 
or activities  
4 Tax breaks or subsidies for SNRM activities  
5 Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more selective taxes collected at the national, 
state, or local level (eg, taxes on alcohol, tobacco, energy, airports, ports, cruise ships, hotel and 
resorts charges, and others) 
6 Earmarking for SNRM financing a percentage of one or more charges, fees, fines, and penalties related 
to the use or abuse) of the natural resource eg, water charges, groundwater charges, stumpage fees, 
and other natural resource extraction fees; hunting fees and entrance and user fees in protected areas; 
charges on emissions and feedstock, release or dumping of fertilizers and pesticides; charges related 
to solid waste, toxic waste, and environmental fines and penalties; etc) 
7 National, state, and local development banks’ loans  
8 DebtCforCnature swaps  
9 Environmental funds (endowment, sinking, and revolving) 
10 Multilateral aid and aid from development agencies  
11 International development banks’ loans  
12 Bilateral aid and development agencies  
Mostly private not3for3profit sources 
13 Community selfCsupport groups and other forms of social capital  
14 Secular and faithCbased charities  
15 Special fundraising campaigns eg, “Save the pandas,” “Friends of the national park,” etc)  
16 Merchandising and good cause marketing  
17 Lotteries  
18 Social and environmental NGOs  
19 Foundations  
Mostly private for3profit sources 
20 Household saving and labor assets  
21 CommunityCbased enterprises—formal (coCops) and informal 
22 MicroCsaving, microCcredit, and microCinsurance  
23 Semiformal and informal microCfinance institutions 
24 Private investment by local businesses  
25 Commercial bank loans  
26 Direct investment by nonlocal investors  
27 PrivateCpublic partnerships  
28 Private sector–community partnerships  
29 Compensatory environmental investment of large developments  
30 Venture capital  
31 Portfolio investors (green funds) 
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Mostly payments for environmental products 
32 Markets for organic agricultural products  
33 Markets for sustainably harvested nonCtimber forest products  
34 Markets for certified forest products  
35 Markets for certified fishery products  
36 Resource extraction charges directly collected by the SNRM project  
37 Allocating part of national, state, or local extraction fees to SNRM projects in the extraction areas  
Mostly payments for environmental services 
38 Markets for biodiversity conservation and bioprospecting  
39 Markets for carbon offsets  
40 Markets for watershed protection  
41 Markets for landscape beauty, including ecotourism and tourism  
42 Markets for development rights and conservation easements  
43 QuasiCmarkets and nonCmarket systems of payments for environmental services  
44 Users fees and entry fees directly collected by the SNRM project  
45 Allocating part of national, state, or local user fees to SNRM projects in the area providing the 
environmental services  
46 Global Environmental Facility (GEF) payments for the global commons 
47 Funds for SNRM associated with international treaties  
48 Other possible systems of international payments for global commons  
49 Earmarking for SNRM part of one or more international taxes  
Mostly reducing the need for additional financing 
50 Freeing up existing public resources (eg, redirecting money from harmful public subsidies to SNRM 
projects) 
51 Encouraging the mobilization of private resources (eg, securing tenure, promotion, regulation 
streamlining) 
52 Mechanisms to increase the accessibility to and reduce the need for and cost of financing (pooling, 
insurance, guarantees, leverage, charrettes, financial literacy training) 
Source: (Gutman, 2003) 
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C: Type of contribution according to ecosystem function (in terms of number of projects) 
 
   ES 
Contribution Biodiversity Carbon Landscape Watershed Bundled 
Grand 
Total 
Agri3environmental scheme 2     2 3 7 
Biodiversity business (NTFP) 3    2 5 
Bioprospecting 12     12 
Carbon offset by companies   55   1 56 
Carbon offset by companies & 
biodiversity   8   6 14 
Carbon offset by government   7    7 
City / province     9  9 
Conservation funding 24 2 1  4 31 
Debt for nature swap 5     5 
Fair trade 10   2 1 13 
Hydropower     9  9 
Local users     18  18 
Market created by policy 4  1 7 1 13 
CSR 6    1 7 
Various credits     1 4 5 
Water authority     12  12 
Recreation 2  48 2 4 56 
Recreation & bio3prospecting 1     1 
Recreation & conservation      1 1 
Undefined 2    1 3 
Grand Total 71 72 50 62 29 284 
(Based on LandellCMills and Porras, 2002; calculations by the authors) 
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D: Source of funding per ecosystem function (in terms of number of projects) 
Financer Biodiversity Bundled Carbon Landscape Watershed Grand Total 
Private 20 (28%) 10 (34%) 46 (64%) 47 (94%) 34 (55%) 157 (55%) 
Private (Multinational)    6 (8%)   6 (2%) 
Private & international NGO  9 (13%)     9 (3%) 
Private & NGO 5 (7%) 6 (21%) 4 (6%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 17 (6%) 
Public 11 (15%) 6 (21%) 3 (4%)  25 (40%) 45 (16%) 
Public & NGO 2 (3%)  1 (1%)   3 (1%) 
Public & international NGO 6 (8%)  1 (1%)   7 (2%) 
Public & Private 3 (4%) 4 (14%) 7 (10%)  2 (3%) 16 (6%) 
Private, Public & NGO 3 (4%)  2 (3%) 1 (2%)  6 (2%) 
NGO 1 (1%)   1 (2%)  2 (1%) 
International NGO 10 (14%) 1 (3%) 2 (3%)   13 (5%) 
International donor 1 (1%)     1 (0%) 
Grand Total 71 (100%) 29 (100%) 72 (100%) 50 (100%) 62 (100%) 284 (100%) 
(Based on LandellCMills and Porras, 2002; calculations by the authors) 
 
NB We have distinguished the source of funding according to financer. More often than not, interests are bundled and delegated to the 
government, a nature conservation organisation (such as WWF), or a donor agency. In the IIED database we labeled the financers 
as public (national governments, city), private (private persons or firms), including multinationals (e.g. Shell), NGO (local or 
international organisation), and international donor (ODA or UN agency). Usually a combination of the categories was made to 
contribute to the governance regime providing the ecosystem functions. These are very broad categories, as usually a mixture of 
financers is associated with the different projects. 
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6.3 Appendix 3: Some do’s and don’ts – results of the workshop of 12 December 2006 
 
Practitioners 
Practitioners whose aim is to protect an ecosystem usually have to combine different ecosystem 
functions with various financing mechanisms and beneficiaries. A oneCsizeCfits all approach cannot 
be determined (cf. Lette and Rozemijer, 2005). Practitioners must review their own situation and 
find solutions that fit best. But some general suggestions can be made. Emerton et al. (2006) 
have assembled several suggestions for practitioners, six of which we will repeat here: 
 
1) As there are multiple different ecosystem functions and financing mechanism s, 
practitioners should build a diverse funding portfolio, going beyond conventional 
mechanisms and including multiple funding sources. Building a diverse, stable and secure 
funding portfolio will also minimize funding risks and fluctuations. 
 
2) Making good use of financing mechanisms also means that funds are managed and 
administered in a way that promotes cost efficiency and management effectiveness, 
allows for longCterm planning and security.  
 
3) The costs of conserving ecosystems do not only include direct costs but also indirect 
and opportunity costs, for instance local development benefits. Thus targeting cash and 
inCkind support to groups who incur costs, while also securing fair contributions from 
beneficiaries, is critical to financial and economic sustainability. Thus practitioners should 
take a comprehensive view of costs and benefits: covering the full range of ecosystem 
costs, ensuring that those who bear costs are recognized and adequately compensated, 
and that those who benefit make a fair contribution to their maintenance. This is easier at 
a local level than a global level as was discussed in section 3.3 on Scope. 
 
4) Often there are broader market, price, policy and institutional distortions that act as 
obstacles to ecosystem funding and financial sustainability. Although correcting them is a 
role for policy makers (see below), practitioners have a role in identifying and 
communicating these to relevant stakeholders. 
 
5) Practitioners are advised to develop a business and financial plan. As Emerton et al. 
(2006) state “ Just as managers in the private sector are expected to understand 
financing issues and tools, [ecosystem] managers are increasingly required to develop the 
same competency. No private business manager could expect an enterprise to thrive 
without good information on costs, cash flow, investment strategies and potential sources 
of funds. [Ecosystem] managers (…) need a similarly detailed understanding of the 
financial implications of managing their site or system.” Such business and financial plans 
identify not only how much money is needed for different activities, but also locates the 
most appropriate funding sources for short, medium and longCterm needs. They can also 
form the basis for priority setting, both in collecting revenue and spending it. 
 
6) Practitioners should put much effort in communication and information dissemination 
about the importance of ecosystem functions, the success by the ecosystem managers 
in securing the provision of ecosystem functions. The internet can be a very costCeffective 
way of doing this, while meeting potential donors face to face may be costly but more 
effective31. Lette and Rozemijer (2005) also make the point that it is important to clearly 
identify the services being provided. Instead of providing information in general terms 
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such as “water catchments protection” it may be more important to define the service into 
a service that beneficiaries enjoy, such as “reliable water supply”. Pagiola et al. (2002) 
therefore suggest to translate the ecosystem function into a marketable service, which 
may be difficult in some cases.  
 
7) Beneficiaries should have confidence in the effectiveness of the financing 
mechanism (see also Lette and Rozemijer, 2005). They should know whether their 
contribution (whether an indirect tax funding or a direct funding) has been effective in the 
sustained provision of the ecosystem functions (Meijerink, 2007). This is why practitioners 
should contribute to monitoring the ecosystem functions adjust the functioning of the 
mechanism should problems arise (Pagiola et al., 2002) 
 
8) Providers of environmental services should actively explore funding possibilities, which 
might mean finding out who is willing to pay, promoting the importance of the 
environmental services provided (e.g. by disseminating information), and offering 
funding mechanisms that are easy to use for beneficiaries (i.e. lower transaction costs). 
Various providers of environmental services could lower costs by working together. 
 
 
Policy makers 
1) For policy makers an important role is to understand the needs and requirements of 
practitioners. Establishing effective communication channels with practitioners and other 
stakeholders involved in ecosystem management and ecosystem functions provision is 
crucial. The needs and requirements of different practitioners may be diverse, as ecosystem, 
ecosystem functions, and financing mechanisms are diverse. 
 
2) Policy makers have a more general role ensuring that property rights are in place and 
enforced, and that the right property rights system that fits with the governance regime is 
defined. In ensuring this, it has an important role in determining what rights vulnerable and 
politically weak groups have (or do not have) and how these can be protected against 
exploitation of more powerful groups in society. 
 
3) The previous point also links up with the overall institutional environment. Policy makers should 
try to create an institutional environment that enables parties to come to agreements and 
enforce these agreements. This can involve different cases. We have seen that a wellC
functioning institutional environment is requires for three of the four financing mechanisms for 
financing mechanism s: 
o Self organized private market arrangements (left hand upper corner); 
o Government supported market creation (left hand bottom corner); 
o Government run financing mechanisms but also the creation of an enabling 
environment (right hand bottom corner). 
 
4) Policy makers should also be aware of policies that have a detrimental effect on the 
protection of ecosystem functions (e.g. perverse incentives or taxes and subsidies) as well as 
on the implementation of financing mechanisms and try to change these where possible. 
 
5) Governments often represent the (public) interests of groups in society. This is especially the 
case for ecosystem functions that have a public nature. The government is expected to 
protect these ecosystem functions in the interest of the public, and therefore (e.g. through 
taxation) pay for the maintenance. But government may find it difficult to know the 
preferences of the public, their willingness to pay (i.e. be taxed). This problem is sometimes 
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couched in terms of “how to gain public support”. Taxation is an unpopular measure, and 
policy makers must find good reasons to implement this. PolicyCmakers may ask researchers 
to do a valuation study of an ecosystem, which basically measures the value that society 
attaches to an ecosystem. But preferences and values are not fixed and can change through 
information and communication. PolicyCmakers have thus an important role in information 
dissemination and communication on the importance of ecosystem functions. 
 
6) PolicyCmakers may play a role in reducing the transaction costs of financing mechanism s. 
They can do this by: 
• Making it more easier for practitioners and potential beneficiaries to contact each other.  
• Facilitating contracts (i.e. agreements) that are established between different parties 
involved in financing mechanism s 
• Facilitate monitoring and enforcement of agreements that have been made between 
different parties involved in financing mechanism s. Parties usually have the option of 
going to court, but other more flexible conflict resolution mechanisms may be more 
appropriate, especially in development countries. 
 
7) The role of policyCmakers is also crucial in global public ecosystem functions. In these cases 
not only the interests of their constituents are involved, but the interests of the earth’s 
inhabitants. Here poverty issues may come into the picture. Governments of rich countries 
may feel the obligation to support the interests of poor countries or poor people in general. 
As the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment has observed, these interests play an increasingly 
important role in environmental issues. PolicyCmakers in rich countries can address these 
issues by creating an institutional environment through international treaties which will enable 
financing mechanisms to be implemented, persuading governments of poor countries in not 
only protecting ecosystems but also supporting the implementation of financing mechanism s. 
 
8) Finally, policy makers can support (international) organizations that are involved in protecting 
ecosystem functions, but more importantly, also are involved in creating and implementing 
financing mechanism s. A list of such organizations is given in Appendix 1. 
 
Results from working groups  
 
A general conclusion in the working groups was that information, communication, raising 
awareness is key to ecosystem management, raising funds and implementing successful financial 
mechanisms: 
1) Publicize the lessons learned of a successful initiative – success will breed success.  
2) Keep the message simple and clear 
3) Messages should have an identifiable image (e.g. polar bear for climate change) 
 
PolicyCmakers play an important role in facilitating financing mechanisms: 
4) Often the most essential bottleneck for financing mechanisms is not the availability of funding 
but the institutional environment. When the institutional environment is extremely weak (and will 
only lead to negative outcomes), it might be better not to implement financial mechanisms. 
5) Let income generated from national park revenues flow back into ecosystem management 
projects and not into general funds  
6) Facilitate promising pilots, and use “local champions” 
7) Bring together stakeholders – identify key policy makers with power and try to bring him/her 
into the process to change things 
8) Start small with a pilot project, achieve critical mass and change. 
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9) Be creative: an example was used of a project with “leasing black rhino’s” private reserves 
with black rhino’s who remain the property of the government.  
10) More emphasis should be placed on international agreements: they should get more authority 
(“teeth”) 
11) But international problems should be small and a solution must be attainable (e.g. ozon hole).  
12) Am to achieve coherence between different ministries and policies. For instance when The 
Netherlands decides not to extract gas or fish for cockles in the Waddensea but allow 
extraction of gas in Russia or cockle fisheries in Mauretania. 
13) PolicyCmakers should not participate in projects but should create the conditions in which 
initiatives can be implemented and succeed (e.g. macroCeconomic policy, regulation etc). In 
developing countries, the government is sometimes regarded with suspicion by the local 
population and active participation would be detrimental to the success of financial 
mechanisms.  
14) The Ministry of Finance often has more financial instruments at its disposal than the Ministries 
that usually engage in ecosystem management (Ministry of Environment, Ministry of 
Agriculture etc). Examples are taxes, subsidies. 
 
Three types of practitioners can be identified: the suppliers (providers of ecosystem functions), 
brokers (intermediaries) and beneficiaries.  
Suppliers: 
1) Take into account opportunity costs 
2) Focus on “commodification” or marketing of ecosystem functions 
3) Organise: take into account power relationships 
Brokers: 
1) Identify (local) partners and facilitate international cooperation 
2) Identify stakeholders 
3) Raise awareness 
4) Organise 
Beneficiaries 
1) Become problem owner 
 
Finally: “be creative and persevere”! 
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6.4 Appendix 4: Recent Practical guides to (Innovative) Financing Mechanisms32 
 
Conservation Finance Alliance. 2002. Mobilizing Funding for Biodiversity Conservation. 
A User3Friendly Training Guide for Understanding, Selecting and Implementing 
Conservation Finance Mechanisms  
To download: www.conservationfinance.org or http://guide.conservationfinance.org/. 
 
Organization: The Conservation Finance Alliance is a partnership of CI, GEF, GTZ, IUCN, Ramsar, 
Redlac, The Nature Conservancy, UNDP, UNEP, USAID, The World Bank, Wildlife Conservation 
Society (WCS), and WWF. 
Description: Created in 2002, the Conservation Finance Alliance, is a joint initiative of 13 
institutions encompassing NGOs, international agencies, and donor agencies to foster the 
financing of conservation projects. Their Web site describes the Alliance’s activities; provides links 
to related initiatives and institutions, including case studies; and provides links to the Training 
Guide mentioned above. The Guide is designed to help expand the use of sustainable finance 
mechanisms to support the conservation of biological diversity. The Guide is an interactive tool 
that also provides instructions for project financial planning and links to other similar training 
material. 
Country case studies: Ecuador, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, Uganda, Belize. 
Financing options: Markets for watershed protection, biodiversity conservation and 
bioprospecting, public budget funding of SNRM projects and programs, environmental funds, 
debtCforCnature swaps, international development banks’ loans. 
 
Interagency Planning Group on Environmental Funds (IPG) (2002). The IPG Handbook on 
Environment Funds  
To download: 
 www.strategyguide.org/Pdfs/GEF/EnvironmentalFundslessonslearnedandfutureprospects.pdf 
 
Organization: IPG is a network of several public and private institutions. 
Description: This is a resource book for the establishment and operation of environmental funds. 
It is intended to share with a wide audience the experience gained by directors and specialists 
who have been involved over the past 10 years in designing, setting up, managing, monitoring, 
and evaluating environmental funds. 
Country case studies: Mexico (The Mexican Nature Conservation Fund), Costa Rica (FONAFIFO), 
Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico Community Foundation), Brazil (Abrinq Foundation for Children’s Rights), 
Philippines (Foundation for the Philippine Environment). 
Financing options: Environmental funds, multilateral aid and development agencies, and bilateral 
aid and development agencies. 
 
The Green Buck: using economic tools to deliver conservation goals, a WWF field guide 
(2005)  
Tom Le Quesne and Richard McNally  
To download: http://www.biodiversityeconomics.org/document.rm?id=715 
 
Organization: WWFCUK 
Description: This guide is intended to provide an introduction for the nonCspecialist to some of 
the approaches that economics can offer. Rather than being focused on economic theory, it 
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demonstrates the ways in which economics can be used, illustrated by caseCstudies from around 
the WWF network where economics has contributed to conservation.  
Financing options: financing conservation, creating markets that support conservation, and 
influencing policies and plans.  
 
Business and Biodiversity: The Handbook for Corporate Action (2002) Nick Bertrand 
Downloadable: http://www.biodiversityeconomics.org/document.rm?id=716 
 
Organisation: Earthwatch Institute (Europe), IUCN, WBCSD 
Description: In 1997, IUCN and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
published a pathCbreaking book: Business and Biodiversity C A Guide for the Private Sector. For the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Devlopment, IUCN and WBCSD joined forces with Earthwatch 
Institute (Europe) to develop a fully revised 'Handbook for Corporate Action'.  
Financing options: the business case for biodiversity, an overview of hot issues, and guidance 
on biodiversity management strategies.  
 
Markets for Ecosystem Services 3 A Potential Tool for Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (2006)  
Anantha Kumar Duraiappah  
Downloadable: www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/economcs_markets_eco_services.pdf 
 
Organisation: IIED 
Description: As legallyCbinding instruments, Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) offer 
an appropriate institutional structure for supporting marketCbased instruments such as payments 
for ecosystem services.  
Financing options: use of proCpoor markets for ecosystem services as a tool for increasing 
synergies between MEAs.  
 
Raising Revenues for Protected Areas, A Menu of Options (2001)  
Barry Spergel  
Downloadable: http://www.biodiversityeconomics.org/document.rm?id=398 
 
Organisation: WWF 
Description: In an age of government budget cuts and declining international aid, this guide is 
intended as a practical tool for those involved in and interested in how protected areas can be 
creatively funded. The guide covers government budget allocations; grants and donations; and 
user fees, taxes, fines, and other revenues generated to fund protected areas. Included are 
examples of how such mechanisms are hard at work around the world and WWF's role in their 
development and implementation. This paper describes more than 25 different ways of raising 
revenues for protected areas. It summarises their relative advantages and disadvantages and lists 
sources for obtaining further information. It is intended as a practical tool for protectedCarea 
managers, finance ministry officials, international donor agencies, and local conservation 
organizations 
Financing options: Incentives, finance and policy; Taxes and subsidies; Conservation finance; 
Protected areas and species 
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7 Endnotes 
                                                 
 
 
1 This differs slightly from the typology used by (Lette and Rozemijer, 2005) 
2 In contrast to more biological definitions which highlight the interactions between organisms and the 
physical environment (such as nutrient cycling, soil development, water budgeting), this report takes the 
economics point of view.  
3 This ties in with Coase (1960; see also Ng, 2005) on the reciprocal nature of externalities. 
4 This problem has been solved in agriCenvironmental schemes in the EU by setting a reference level. If 
farmers produce environmental services below this reference level, the polluterCpaysCprincipal prevails, but if 
farmers produce above this level, they are paid for this additional production (and funding for environmental 
services prevails) (BenstedCSmith, 2007). 
5 Verweij (ibid) also points out the difference between financing mechanisms and economic incentive 
measures. The latter category includes economic measures, regulatory measures, the provision of 
information, and institutional capacity strengthening. An overlap between incentive measures and financing 
mechanisms exists of economic incentives (taxes, charges, tradable use rights and subsidies) and 
regulatory measures as far as these result in compensation funding (e.g. development or access 
restrictions, compensation for negative environmental impacts). The difference is that financing 
mechanisms comprise a wide(r) range of market mechanisms that finance the desired outputs fully, or to a 
large extent. 
6 This is called “bounded rationality”: bounded rational agents experience limits in formulating and solving 
complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information 
7 Because of the soCcalled “CondorcetCArrow paradox of social choice”. This occurs when an individual 
prefers A over B, B over C and C over A. 
8 This problem of not being able to measure preferences appears in valuation studies using contingent 
valuation, which uses surveys to ask people directly for their preferences. Contingent valuation received a 
“stamp of approval” by a panel (with two Nobel Laureates) reporting on whether CV could be used in the 
ExxonCValdez oil spill . However, it is widely recognised that, in order to be useful, respondents to CV 
surveys must have a large amount of information regarding the projects and the environmental resources 
they are asked to value (Gans, 1999; Ajzen et al., 1996). The panel has written: 
“Suppose information is desired about individuals’ willingness to pay to prevent a chemical leak into a 
river. Presumably, their responses would depend importantly on how long it would take for the chemical 
to degrade naturally in the river (if it would at all), what ecological and human health damage the 
chemical would do until it had degraded, and so on. In the absence of information about such matters, it 
is unreasonable to expect even very bright and wellCinformed respondents to place meaningful values on 
a program to prevent leaks” (Arrow et al., 1993: 4605). 
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
10 Called resource regime by Vatn (2005) 
11 In property rights structure, property rights are defined as a structure of duties that will give any 
particular benefit stream protection against adverse claims. Rights have no meaning without correlated 
duties. (Bromley, 1992) 
12 Brousseau et al. (2007) distinguish rules for decisionCmaking and for enforcement 
13 CDM arrangements related to funding for additional sequestration of biomass in developing countries 
such as Indonesia have not materialized due to the administrative burden to implement CDM (Silvius & 
Diemont in press). 
14 Defined as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the 
process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to 
effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) Project) Available at www.govindicators.org 
15 Note that property rights can be assigned to the resource managers supplying the ecosystem function. A 
natural area that provides certain ecosystem functions that are enjoyed by many people (such as landscape 
beauty) may be owned and managed by one entity.  
16 Official Development Assistance 
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17 In Chapter 6 Vulnerable Peoples and Places:  
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.275.aspx.pdf 
18 Or ´resource transfers’ 
19 Bundled is a category in which various environmental services are “bundled” within one project 
20 This information is obtained from CREA http://www.cocobolonaturereserve.org/ 
21 Information about Charity Choice can be found on https://www.charitychoice.co.uk/ and Network for 
Good on http://www.networkforgood.org/ 
22 see http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=Funds&ItemID=24670  
23 Projections of the annual mitigation market in 2008C2012 have dropped from 300C700 million tons of 
carbon equivalent (Mtce) to 0C300 Mtce. Carbon price estimates for 2010 have dropped from a range of 
$60 to $160 per tce with U.S. participation in the Kyoto regime to $3 to $87 per tce without U.S. 
participation. (IEA, 2001; Heller & Shukla, 2003). 
24 The impact of the need for biofuels in the world could even increase deforestation, taken in account that 
profits for instance of oil palm are over 1000 US$/Ha/year. On the other hand there is a lot of marginal 
already opened land for agriculture in the tropics, which could be (conditionally) be used for palm oil 
plantations and probably soy and sugar cane (Diemont et al 2002; Silvius & Diemont 2007). 
25 This has been taken from a paper written by Herbert Diemont, Albert Corporaal, Anne Katrin Engelbrecht, 
Anton Stortelder, Raymond Schrijver. 2007. Alterra & LEI (WageningenCUR) and interreg Lifescape / 
Northsea project  
26 Taken from the Biorights brochure. Available from Wetlands International 
27 This information has been provided by WWF:  
http://www.worldwildlife.org/conservationfinance/trustfunds.cfm. Accessed at 29/11/07 
28 Information from http://www.streekrekeninghetgroenewoud.nl/ 
29 Information from (LandellCMills and Porras, 2002; Arentino et al., 2001; Volery, 2002); 
http://www.delisted.com.au/Company/2772/EARTH%20SANCTUARIES%20LIMITED and 
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2002/s459194.htm  
30 Based on (LandellCMills and Porras, 2002) and information provided by Industry Canada:  
http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/eaCae.nsf/en/ea02023e.html  
31 A business plan also has an important communication role. It can indicate funding needs to government 
agencies and other donors (and beneficiaries). Finally, a coherent business plan serves to demonstrate 
management competence with the benefit that fundCraising may be easier than would otherwise be the case 
(Emerton et al., 2006). 
32 Information from (Gutman, 2003) and www.biodiversityeconomics.org  
